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Self-Help In Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self
Defense and Peacetime Reprisals
Guy B. Roberts*
I. INTRODUCTION
"I will do such things-what they are, yet I know not; but they
shall be the terrors of the earth!"
-Shakespeare 1
The stamp of terrorism is on our times. It has become a phenomenon of
almost everyday occurrence that seems to escalate continually in its
violence, horror and senselessness. The recently attempted hijacking of
Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi which left seventeen dead, the massacre of
twenty-two Jews in Istanbul's Neve Shalom Synagogue,2 bomb blasts in
West Germany and the Netherlands, eight bombing incidents in Paris
within ten days last September, and two more Americans kidnapped by
masked gunmen in Beruit 3 have brought terrorism vividly and graphi-
cally into the public eye. Every year seems to be marked by one or more
spectacular terrorist events. In 1983, there were the car bombing of the
U.S. Marine Corps battalion landing team's headquarters in Beirut
which killed 241 servicemen4 and the detonation of two mines in the
Martyrs' Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma which claimed the lives of
twenty-one South Korean and Burmese dignitaries. In 1984, the U.S.
embassy in East Beirut was again targetted by terrorists (the original em-
bassy was bombed in 1983), and an English policewoman was shot by
* The author is an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Pacific
Forces, Camp Smith, Hawaii, and serves as the legal advisor to the Special Operations Command.
He is a graduate of Arizona State University (B.A. 1972); University of Denver (J.D. 1975); Univer-
sity of Southern California (London Program) (A.M. 1983); and Georgetown University (LLM In-
ternational and Comparative Law 1985). He is admitted to practice in Colorado, California,
Arizona, Tenth Circuit, U.S. Court of Military Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the U.S. Government or any of its agencies.
I KING LEAR, Act II, sc. iv.
2 See Carnage Once Again and Massacre in the Synagogue, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 30-35.
3 Fingerprints of Terror, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 1986, at 52.
4 For a full discussion of this attack which resulted in more Marines being killed in a single day
(239) since the assault on Iwo Jima in World War II, see GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, REPORT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TERRORIST ACT,
OCT. 23, 1983, (Dec. 20, 1983) [hereinafter Long Commission Report].
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persons sequestered inside the Libyan People's Bureau (pseudo-embassy)
in London's West End.
1985 proved to be the most violent year in the history of terrorism
with more than 800 international terrorist incidents. This was a 60 per-
cent increase over the rate of the previous two years.5 There were 2,177
casualties (877 dead) attributable to international terrorism, 6 the last and
most horrific being the grenade and machine gun attacks against Israel's
El Al Airlines in Rome and Vienna.7 At this writing, there have been
well over 1,000 casualties, including over 350 dead.8
1985 was a banner year in terms of terrorist attacks against United
States citizens as well.9 More Americans were killed (28) and injured
(160) than in any other year except 1983 (when the Marine headquarters
in Beirut was bombed).10 While statistically the number of Americans
attacked is low, Americans remain the number one target of terrorists
worldwide. I
In the past decade, there have been more than 6,200 terrorist inci-
dents recorded worldwide. This "trail of carnage" includes some 4,700
dead, more than 9,000 injured and untold millions of dollars in property
damage. Obviously, these figures do not begin to measure the human
misery due to societies fragmented and families shattered by the tragedy
of terrorism. Clearly, international terrorism is here to stay; and Ameri-
cans will continue to be faced with its ever present danger.
The use of terrorism as a tool to obtain political goals is not new.12
While the practice of terrorism dates back centuries, its current resur-
gence, technology, and potential for extreme violence--the realm of pure
5 Statement of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger before the opening session of the
American Bar Association's National Conference on Law in Relation to Terrorism, June 5, 1986,
reported in 8 ABA STANDING COMMITrEE LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE RE-
PORT 8 (July 1986).
6 See Statement of Ambassador R.B. Oakley, Acting Ambassador at Large for Counter-terror-
ism, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1 (Aug. 1986).
7 A particularly disturbing aspect of the Rome assaults was the apparently deliberate attempt
by the terrorists to single out children for death. See 1986 TVI JOURNAL 1 (Winter 1986).
8 Statement of Ambassador Oakley, supra note 6, at 13, plus the author's inclusion of the dead
and wounded in the September Istanbul and Karachi attacks. Since 1986 figures are still being
accumulated and assessed, the statistic is a conservative estimate at best.
9 See Chronology of Major American-Related Terrorist Incidents, 1985, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 13
(Aug. 1986).
10 132 CONG. REc., Vol. 88, at S8410 (June 25, 1986).
11 See generally U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984 (Nov. 1985); U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1982 (Sept. 1984); Livingstone &
Arnold, Democracy Under Attack, in FIGHTING BACK: WINNING THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
(N. Livingstone & T. Arnold, eds. 1986) [hereinafter FIGHTING BACK].
12 R. Friedlander, The Origins of International Terrorism: A Micro-Legal-Historical Perspec-
tive, 6 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 49 (1976); A. PARRY, TERRORISM FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ARAFAT
(1976).
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terror-are new. Although an old social and political phenomenon, ter-
rorism has recently received renewed attention primarily because of the
proliferation of terrorist activities; the dramatic, shocking and media-
catching nature of most terrorist events; and, the seeming helplessness of
the terrorist targets-Western democracies. These factors have allowed
terrorists and their sponsors to act with relative impunity. Most impor-
tantly, government initiated or regime sponsored terror-violence has be-
come an attractive alternative to conducting modern conventional war,
particularly in a world society that, at minimum, pays lip service to gen-
eral principles condemning aggressive and direct warfare.1 3 In sum, ter-
rorism has become another "weapons system," a cheap means of waging
war against one's enemies.14
Despite numerous efforts to legislate away terrorism, to establish
harsher punishments for terrorist acts, and to seek closer cooperation
with other nations, acts of terrorism continue to plague us. All of the
recent efforts to use law to fight terrorism have largely failed. The rea-
sons for this are complex, but generally center around the world commu-
nity's failure to condemn terrorist acts regardless of their motivation. In
order to have an effective legal regime proscribing and punishing terror-
ism, states must adopt and apply common standards on which acts of
violence will be treated as crimes. Currently, national policy differences
have prevented states from agreeing on regulation and enforcement.
They have refused to adopt and apply common standards, or a legal pro-
cess, that distinguishes permissible from impermissible violence. Addi-
tionally, as Judge Sofaer has noted, terrorist activities are criminal acts:
... Terrorism, in essence, is criminal activity. In applying law domes-
tically, governments seek to punish and deter crime as effectively as
possible. But they recognize that law cannot eliminate crime. They
can expect even less of the law in dealing with international terrorism.
The world has no international police force or judicial system. 15
When law and diplomacy fail, states look to other methods of pro-
tecting themselves. Foremost among these is the use of force. After the
U.S. hostages in Iran were released in 1981, President Reagan declared:
"Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are
13 See the discussion on self-defense and reprisals, infra. Arguably, all wars are illegal under
the United Nations Charter, which limits justification for war to cases of self-defense U.N CHARTER
art. 51 or collective security U.N. CHARTER art. 52; Dinstein, Terrorism and Wars of Liberation, 3
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 78 (1973).
14 Legislation to Combat Terrorism: Hearings on H.R. Rea 233; H.R. Con. Res. 339; H.R.
5612; H.R. 5613; H.R. 6311 before the Subcomms. on International Security and Scientific Affairs
and International Operations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983)
(statement of Brian M. Jenkins, Director, Security and Subnational Conflict Program, Rand Corp.)
Is Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN Are. 901, 902 (Summer 1986).
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violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. ' 16 De-
spite this and other statements promising retaliation, little was done.
Secretary of State George Shultz's frustrations over U.S. inaction in the
face of the mounting terrorist challenge finally boiled over in the form of
one of the strongest speeches on terrorism by a government official. He
declared that the United States must be ready to use military force to
fight terrorism and retaliate for terrorist attacks even before all the facts
are known. In any event, "we may never have the kind of evidence that
can stand up in an American court of law." 17 Shultz concluded that we
must be prepared to accept the loss of some innocent lives as a collateral
result of our use of force. However, he added:
[W]e cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worry-
ing endlessly over whether and how to respond. A great nation with
global responsibilities cannot afford to be hamstrung by confusion and
indecisiveness. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant con-
test, but we have no choice but to play it.18
Any use of force by a nation inevitably raises questions regarding
the ability of law to impose restraints on a state's recourse to force. For
example, in discussing the legal aspects of the U.S. action in Grenada in
1983, a special committee study prepared for the American Bar Associa-
tion's Section of International Law and Practice reported:
[T]here has been a steady erosion of the legal norms governing the use
of force in international relations that did not begin with the United
States' intervention in Grenada, and that this erosion has left national
leaders feeling less constrained by these norms than they once were.
This, we think, is a dangerous trend. History has shown that the suc-
cessful use of the military instrument has a tendency to become habit
forming, with the right to use armed force inferred by the victor from
the fact of victory.1
Given the dismal fact of contemporary history that international
law has largely failed to develop comprehensive standards to deal with
terrorism orto take any meaningful action to counter the global terrorist
threat, states will be faced increasingly with the necessity to use self-help
measures and act unilaterally against the threat of terrorism. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to examine legal justifications for the use of force
which since 1945 have focused primarily centered on actions premised on
self-defense. However, some actions which may be necessary to combat
16 N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1981, at B13, col. 3.
17 Address by Secretary of State George Shultz, Terrorism and The Modern World, The Scherr
Lecture, at the Park Avenue Synagogue, New York, Oct. 25, 1984, at 23, reported in N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 1984, at 12 [hereinafter Scherr Lecture].
1 Id.
19 Committee on Grenada, Special Report-International Law and U.S. Action in Grenada, 18
INT'L L. 331, 333-34 (1984).
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terrorism may not always be justifiable as purely actions in self-defense.
The primary focus of this article is that unilateral actions taken by a state
in response to terrorism should be judged on whether such actions are
necessary and appropriately restrained. These self-help measures should
not be limited to acts in self-defense, but should also include the ability to
conduct peacetime reprisals if the occasion warrants. The present stan-
dards regulating the use of force have proven inadequate. This was one
of the conclusions of the Committee on Grenada's Report:
In some measure, existing legal norms governing the use of armed
force reflect past needs and experiences more than current ones. To
the extent, for example, that reasonable efforts to counter insidious
forms of aggression, protect human rights, restore civil order or
achieve other legitimate ends do not square with the law or our present
treaty commitments, perhaps the law needs amendment and our treaty
commitments need updating.20
Last year, in a speech before the American Bar Association, Presi-
dent Reagan called on international lawyers to accept the challenge "to
become part of the solution to the problem of terrorism."'" If anything
can be clear in the war on terrorism it is that there are glaring gaps in the
legal control of this "leprosy of modem times." Controls in the domestic
setting are applied relatively easily because the domestic criminal law of
the United States, for example, can amply respond through its numerous
enforcement agencies to terroristic acts. This is not, however, the case
internationally. International law is unenforceable; it lacks a legal sys-
tem that backs its laws with the trappings of justice, courts, juries, police,
prisons, etc. Consequently, great gaps exist when a response to terrorist
violence is needed, particularly when states that sponsor terrorism insist
their conduct constitutes a form of violence for legitimate ends, therefore
acceptable under international law.
Sophisticated terrorist organizations-armed, trained and supported
by radical states such as Libya-pose one of the greatest threats to West-
ern democracies. In view of recent attacks and the continuous, grim up-
surge in terrorism, the American public is beginning to question seriously
an international system that is either structured or construed to provide
terrorists and those who sponsor them freedom from accountability. Re-
sponses to terrorism have taken many forms, primarily quiet diplomacy.
However, it is clear that any comprehensive plan to stop terrorism must
include the option of using force when all else fails.
The idea of using force to combat terrorism has gained wide accept-
20 Id. Professor Wallace, one of the committee members, has presented his thoughts on how to
fill the gaps. See Wallace, International Law and the Use of Force, 19 INT'L L. 259 (1985).
21 Reagan, The New Network of Terrorist States, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 7, 9 (Aug. 1985).
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ance among officials within the Reagan administration. Secretary of
State Shultz observed that:
We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should
go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, pre-
emption and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future
terrorist acts and experience has taught over the years that one of the
best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure meas-
ures will be taken against those who engage in it.
22
Former presidential national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane was
just as explicit:
We cannot and will not abstain from forcible action to prevent, pre-
empt or respond to terrorist acts where conditions merit the use of
force. Many countries, including the United States, have the specific
forces and capabilities we need to carry out operations against terrorist
groups.
2 3
As demonstrated by the U.S. strike on Libya subsequent to the April
1986 disco bombing in Berlin, these words have been transformed into
deeds.
Since the United States has committed itself to the use of military
force as one option in the war on terrorism, and because the present in-
ternational legal system has so far failed to provide adequate protection,
it is useful to distinguish the accepted and permissible uses of force (self-
defense) in the world community from impermissible uses (reprisals), and
propose a more realistic and practical approach to regulation of the use
of force. However, prior to analyzing self-defense and peacetime repri-
sals as self-help measures to combat terrorism, we must first briefly ex-
amine and determine the meaning of the word "terrorism" and the
significance of state sponsorship.
II. TERRORISM, THE TERRORIST AND STATE SPONSORSHIP
A. The Definitional Anomaly
"I know it when I see it." -Justice Potter Stewart2
4
Definitions of terrorism are as prolific as its many manifestations.
Indeed, as with obscenity, perhaps we are trying to define that which
may be indefinable. Usually the complaint is not that there are no defini-
tions, but rather there are too many and too diverse. Some believe the
term is indefinable and therefore should be eliminated. For example,
22 Shultz, supra note 17.
23 Address by Robert McFarlane, Terrorism and the Future of Free Society, to the National
Strategy Information Center, Mar. 25, 1985.
24 Jacobillis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J. concurring).
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Judge Baxter believed that "[w]e have cause to regret that a legal concept
of 'terrrorism' was ever inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise; it is
ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose." 5 An-
other critic remarked: "Terror and terrorism are not words which refer
to a well defined and clearly identified set of factual events. Neither do
the words have any widely accepted meaning in legal doctrine. Terror
and terrorism, consequently, do not refer to a unitary concept in either
law or fact." 6
Despite these criticisms, attempts to define and thus condemn ter-
rorism continue.2 7 Certainly terrorism is not a legal term of art. It has
been defined for national purposes; and it is generally recognized without
difficulty. But for the lawyer, particularly the international lawyer, the
term presents a number of definitional problems which highlight the de-
pendence of law on the political order in which it operates. A successful
definition must be based upon agreement as to the nature of the phenom-
enon to be described. Unfortunately, at an international level there is
wide disagreement concerning the circumstances when it is legitimate to
use violence for political ends.
The difficulty in defining terrorism has led to the ciceh6 that one
man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. But to confuse the ter-
rorist with a freedom fighter is to allow those groups and states that sup-
port terrorism to define away the term. For Senator Jackson the
distinction between the two is self-evident:
The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another "freedom fighter"
cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow
up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom
fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist
murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent business-
men, or hijack and hold hostage men, women, and children; terrorist
murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the trea-
sured word "freedom" to be associated with the acts of terrorists.2
8
25 Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REv. 380 (1974).
26 W. Mallison & S. Mallison, The Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law:
Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values, 18 How. L.J. 12
(1974).
27 For a description of the numerous attempts to define terrorism see Sloan, Conceptualizing
Political Terror: A Typology, 32 J. INT'L Arr. 7 (1970). See also W. LAQUEUR, TERRORISM 5-8, 13-
18 (1978).
28 Jackson, Terrorism as a Weapon in International Politics, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
33, 36 (1981). President Reagan recently made much the same comparison between freedom fighters
and terrorists when he said: "Freedom fighters do not need to terrorize a population into submis-
sion. Freedom fighters target the military forces and the organized instruments of repression keep-
ing dictatorial regimes in power. Freedom fighters struggle to liberate their citizens from oppression
and to establish a form of government that reflects the will of the people. Radio Address, May 31,
1986 reported in 86 DEP'T ST. BULL 23 (Sept. 1986).
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Several experts, most recently Judge Sofaer, have noted how terror-
ist organizations have shrewdly sought to come under the umbrella of
legitimacy by asserting that they seek self-determination, and are en-
gaged in a war of "liberation" to free the "people" from a "colonialist,"
or "racist" regime. 9 They often use the name of "People's Army," or
"Liberation Army," and style themselves as "freedom fighters," or
"guerillas." In 1973, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
Resolution 3103 proclaiming that "armed conflicts involving the struggle
of peoples against colonial and racist regimes are to be regarded as inter-
national armed conflicts... . ,3' No distinction was made between liber-
ation wars and terrorist acts; and this Resolution has often been invoked
by terrorist organizations to support their activities. Other United Na-
tions actions have further blurred the distinction between "freedom fight-
ers" and terrorists. In 1972, after the Lod Airport attack by Japanese
terrorists, United Nations Secretary General Waldheim attempted to
push a resolution through the General Assembly condemning these acts
of terror. Instead, many nations rejected out of hand any proposal of
"rules for the purpose of assigning legal limits" to so-called revolutionary
armed struggle. '31 For example, the delegate from Madagascar stated:
Acts of terrorism inspired by base motives of personal gain were to be
condemned. Acts of political terrorism, on the other hand, undertaken
to vindicate hallowed rights recognized by the United Nations, were
praiseworthy. It was, of course, regrettable that certain acts in the
latter category affected innocent persons.32
And the statement of the delegate from Algeria:
His delegation did not agree with the statement of the Secretariat's
report that the legitimacy of a cause did not in itself justify recourse to
certain forms of violence. Those serving the cause in question should
have a choice of the means to be used.3 3
One noted authority has criticized U.N. measures as, in essence,
having the effect of "encouraging third party intervention on behalf of
self-proclaimed liberationists and condoning terrorist activity conducted
under color of claims to self-determination. 34
Despite the unlimited quantity of definitions and the lack of a global
consensus on what terrorism is--due in no small part to the difficulty of
29 Sofaer, supra note 15, at 904.
30 G.A. Res. 3103, 128 U.N. GAOR Supp., (No. 30) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
31 Sofaer, supra note 15, at 904.
32 Id.
33 Id. See also Statements of Cameroon and Somali, GAOR, 6th Comm., 27th Sess., L.J. 493,
495 (1982).
34 R. Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: Recent Developments, 13 RUTGERS L.J.
493, 495 (1982).
Vol. 19:243
SELF-HELP
formulating an acceptable definition because of the political character of
the conduct- 35 it is, nevertheless, useful to create a working definition.
The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as follows:
Terrorism: The threat or use of violence for political purposes by indi-
viduals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established
governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock, stun
or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.
International Terrorism: Terrorism conducted with the support of a
foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign
nationals, institutions, or governments. Terrorism has involved groups
seeking to overthrow specific regimes to rectify national or group
grievances or to undermine international order as an end in itself.
36
One expert defined terrorism as acts that in themselves may be clas-
sic forms of crime-murder, arson, the use of explosives- but differ
from typical crimes because they are executed "with the deliberate inten-
tion of causing panic, disorder, and terror within an organized society."' 37
Terrorism can be defined objectively by the quality of the act, not by
the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause. All terrorist
acts are crimes, and many would also be war crimes or "grave breaches"
of the rules of war if we were to accept the terrorist's assertion that they
are waging war.3" All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of vio-
lence, sometimes coupled with explicit demands. These acts are often
directed against civilian targets, and often carried out in a way that will
achieve maximum publicity. The purposes are political. The actors are
usually members of organized groups which are by necessity secretive;
but, unlike other criminals, terrorists often claim credit for their acts.
Finally, the hallmark of terrorism is that the acts are intended to produce
psychological effects far beyond the immediate physical damage.39 Ter-
rorism becomes "international" when the terrorist incidents have clear
35 See Waugh, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: How NATIONS RESPOND TO TERRORISTS, ch.
11(1982).
36 OFFICE OF COMBATTING TERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM: 1982 (1983).
37 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Statement of Reasons for the Draft Convention on Ter-
rorism and Kidnapping, Oct. 5, 1970, O.A.S. Document Cp/doc. 54/70 (Oct. 5, 1970), (rev. 1),
(Nov. 4, 1970), (quoting Eduardo Arechaga in an article published in ANUARIO URUGUAYO DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (1962)).
38 Some scholars have argued that we should apply the laws of war to terrorists and judge their
conduct on the basis of those standards. See A. Rubin, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 12 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1983); J. Paust, Terrorism and the International Law of War, 64 MiL. L. REV.
1 (1974); W. Mallison & S. Mallison, The Control of State Terror Through the Application of the
International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CON-
TEMPORARY WORLD 325 (1978). Contra, M. Wilkinson, The Laws of War and Terrorism, in THE
MORALITY OF TERRORISM: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR JUSTIFICATIONS 308 (1980).
39 R. FEARY, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 25 (M. Living-
ston ed. 1978). See also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978). For a simi-
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international consequences. Terrorism transcends national boundaries
through the choice of a foreign victim or target, the commission of a
terrorist act in a foreign country, or an effort to coerce or intimidate a
foreign government into changing its policies.'
While these criteria do not eliminate all ambiguity, they enable us to
draw some limits and answer some questions. Terrorism differs from or-
dinary crime in its political purpose and its primary objective. Its dis-
tinction from an ordinary criminal act is clear. It is not synonymous
with guerrilla war or any other kind of war. In fact, "one man's terrorist
is everyone's terrorist."' 4 1 Terrorists primarily specialize in attacking
targets that are forbidden to military belligerents. When they occasion-
ally attack military or police targets, their primary purpose is to strike
fear into the target society rather than defeat military forces. Terrorism
emphasizes attacking persons and targets without the justification of or-
dinary military necessity, since the purpose is to terrorize rather than to
perform ordinary military tasks.
While some writers and a number of states have argued that the
purpose behind the act determines its morality and thus legitimacy,4' the
definitional discussion above rejects that argument in favor of focusing
on the degree of emphasis placed on attacking nonmilitary targets for the
purpose of terrorizing a society. Nevertheless, it is an unfortunate fact of
life in our world community that until states can reach consensus on
what is acceptable and unacceptable international conduct, we will have
no respite from this phenomena defined as terrorism. As Solzhenitsyn
once wrote:
The great world organization of man was unable to bring forth even a
moral condemnation of terrorism. A selfish majority in the United
Nations countered such a condemnation with yet another effort at du-
bious distinction by asking whether any form of terrorism was in fact
harmful. And what is the definition of terrorism, anyway? They
might well have suggested in jest: 'when we are attacked, it's terror-
ism, but when we do the attacking, it's a guerilla movement of libera-
tion.' But let's be serious. They refuse to regard as terrorism a
treacherous attack in a peaceful setting, on peaceful people, by military
men carrying concealed weapons and often dressed in plain clothes, as
terrorism. They demand instead that we study the aims of terrorist
groups, their bases of support and their ideology, and then perhaps
lar definition of international terrorism see SENSE-OF-SENATE RESOLUTION, 132 CONG. REC. S8435
(daily ed. June 25, 1986).
40 B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE OTHER WORLD 4 (1985).
41 B. Jenkins, About Terrorism, 12 ANNALS 463 (Sept. 1983).
42 Young, Revolutionary Terrorism, Crime and Morality, 4 Soc. THEORY AND PRAC. 287
(1977); 0. Oruka, Legal Terrorism and Human Rights, 1985 Praxis Inter. 376 (Jan.). See generally,
THE MORALITY OF TERRORISM, RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 38.
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acknowledge them to be sacred "guerillas." 4 3
B. State Sponsored Terrorism
"In principle we have never rejected, nor can we reject, terror. Terror
is one of the forms of military action that may be perfectly suitable,
even essential, at a definite juncture in the struggle."
-V. Lenin4
Americans generally assume that others will agree that international
terrorism or at least terroristic acts are unacceptable. Unfortunately, as
noted previously,45 acceptance of terrorism is not confined to the fanatics
who carry out these acts. Indeed, many nations have recognized the
great potential of terrorism. The terrorist is now the spearhead of a de-
veloping theory and practice of surrogate warfare. Primarily the support
of various states has caused terrorism to become a world problem of such
magnitude. While terrorist acts are criminal and are treated accordingly,
support for those state actions in and against the sovereignty of another
state is nothing less than warfare, albeit covert and relatively cheap. As
described by the State Department, "[tierrorism is every bit as much a
form of war against a nation's interest and values as a full-scale armed
attack. And it is a weapon wielded particularly against innocent civil-
ians, against free nations, against democracy, against moderation and
peaceful solutions. '46
A former Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations called state
sponsored terrorism "a weapons system that is devastatingly effective.
With very few exceptions, all terrorism is state-sponsored, state-imple-
mented, or state condoned."'47 A growing number of governments also
are using terrorist tactics themselves or employing terrorist groups as a
mode of surrogate warfare. As modern, traditional warfare becomes in-
creasingly impractical-it is expensive, excessively destructive and world
opinion may impose "inconvenient" restraints-nations, particularly
those which cannot mount a conventional military challenge, increas-
ingly see terrorism as the only viable alternative.
Why is state-sponsored terrorism more dangerous than the more
"traditional" terrorism? With state support, terrorist groups can be
43 Solzhenitsyn, Peace and Violence, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1973, at M27.
44 LENIN, COLLECTED WORKS, Vol. 5, quoted in WAR AND PEACE: SOVIET RUSSIA SPEAKS
23 (1983).
45 See, text accompanying supra notes 28 through 37.
46 Address by Secretary of State George Shultz, U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 23, 1985) 85
DEP'T ST. BULL. 10 (Nov. 1985).
47 Johnson, Defusing the Radical Entente, The World and I Washington Times Special Edition,
Mar. 1986 at 98. See also N. Livingstone & T. Arnold, The Rise of State Sponsored Terrorism, in
FIGHTING BACK, supra note II, at 14; THE STATE AS TERRORIST, (Stuhl and Lopez eds. 1984).
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much more lethal and have far greater operational reach. Money, sanc-
tuary, weapons and munitions, intelligence, training and technical exper-
tise are much more readily available to terrorist than to traditional
groups. Likewise, there are fewer constraints on such groups; they plan
large-scale operations without unduly worrying "about alienating per-
ceived constituents or provoking public backlash," since they need not
depend on the local population for support.4"
With the advent of state sponsorship, international terrorism has
come to resemble the workings of a multinational corporation. For ex-
ample, "an operation would be planned in West Germany by Palestinian
Arabs, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan with weapons
acquired in Italy but manufactured in Russia, supplied by an Algerian
diplomat, and financed with Libyan money."49 While groups like the
Abu Nidal terrorist organization may not be under the direct control of a
state, an overwhelming amount of evidence substantiates that these
groups receive money, training, equipment, passports and state con-
trolled safe havens such as Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, presently controlled
by Syria.5° Perhaps the challenge that state supported international ter-
rorism poses for Western democracies is best summarized in a recent
Joint Chiefs of Staff Report:
State support for wars of national liberation and international terrorist
organizations will be a special concern. Support from the Soviet
Union, North Korea, Cuba and their allies and the provision of finan-
cial aid, weapons and training from Syria, Iran, Libya, and the Peo-
ple's Democratic Republic of Yemen will likely continue. Terrorists
may or may not be centrally controlled by their patrons. Nevertheless,
the instability they create in industrialized Western and Third World
nations undermines the security interests of the United States and its
allies.5 '
While "we may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in
an American court of law,"' 52 the evidence of state support is nevertheless
compelling. It is rare that terrorist attacks can be so directly linked to
their state sponsor as in the 1983 Rangoon bombing,5 3 or the Libyan
instigated attack on the Berlin disco in April 1986.54 Yet, there is plenty
48 Jenkins, The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma 1985, ARMED FORCES J. INT'L
41 (Apr.).
49 W. LACQUEUR, GUERRILLA: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY 324 (1976).
50 See e.g., Weinberger Links Abu Nidal to Karachi Hijack Attempt, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1986,
at 30.
51 ORG. OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. MILITARY POSTURE FISCAL YEAR 1986, 94-95
(1987).
52 Shultz, supra note 17.
53 FIGHTING BACK, supra note 51.
54 See INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, APRIL 16, 1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 8, 9 (June
1986).
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of evidence of an active campaign to support and encourage terrorist at-
tacks against the United States and her allies. The states most active are
Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua. The Soviet
Union and Eastern European nations stand in the background as trainers
and promoters.
Having proven the value of terrorism as a tool in the 1979 American
hostage crisis,55 the Iranians have since employed terrorists, either under
direct Iranian control or responsive to Iran's direction, in numerous at-
tacks against the United States, other Western states and moderate states
in the Middle East. As stated by Central Intelligence Agency Director
William Casey, "more blood has been shed by Iranian terrorists than any
other," including fifty-seven incidents in 1983, and sixty-six in 1984.56
Its policy of terrorism was typified by Iran's announcement regarding the
Shah and other enemies of the Iranian revolution:
Anyone who wants to assassinate these people in Iran or outside [could
be] free anywhere to carry out the order of the court. They cannot be
arrested by any foreign government as a terrorist because they will be
carrying out the order of Iran's Islamic revolutionary court.57
Most of the attacks, certainly the most deadly, sponsored by Iran have
been carried out in Lebanon and Kuwait. Its most infamous surrogate is
the so-called Islamic Jihad. Working with Syria,58 Iran has actively sup-
ported bombings, kidnappings, hijackings and assassinations; and it al-
lows within its borders bases where terrorists can rest, train and re-equip
to be maintained. In sum, "the pattern of Iranian-backed attacks against
U.S. and other targets in the Middle East and elsewhere is clear and is
part of an ongoing effort by the Khomeini regime to internationalize its
revolution."59
Libya-reminiscent of the pirate state it once was-is probably the
most open and notorious advocate of terrorism. President Reagan
quoted Qadhafi as saying that Libya was "capable of exporting terrorism
to the heart of America. We are also capable of physical liquidation and
destruction and arson inside America."6 Also, a recent official publica-
tion of Libya's Revolutionary Committee, Al Zahf al Akhadar, stated:
Libya should support, train, and arm West German and Irish terrorists
in retaliation against Western countries that harbor anti-Qadhafi 'ter-
5 See Malawar, Rewarding Terrorism: The U.S. Iranian Hostage Accords, INT'L SEc. R. 447-
96 (Winter 1981-82).
56 Casey, International Linkages-What Do We Know?, HYDRA OF CARNAGE 5 (1985).
57 Jackson, supra note 28, at 36.
58 Some intelligence agencies consider Syria one of the most active supporters of Middle East
terrorists. See Beecher Syria and Terror: How to Reply to 'Smoking Gun', Boston Globe, Oct. 29,
1986, at 26.
59 N. Livingstone and T. Arnold, supra note 47, at 17.
60 Reagan, supra note 21, at 7.
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rorist.' A few days later, [Qadhafi] spoke by satellite to a Black Mus-
lim convention in Chicago and pledged that Libya was ready to give
black separatists arms so that they could create their own 'sovereign
state in America.' He also called on blacks in the U.S. military to
desert and form the backbone of an army of liberation (footnotes
omitted).61
The evidence of other states actively engaged in the support of ter-
rorist groups and acts is equally compelling.62 Most important, however,
are the activities of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has continued to
be an active sponsor of terrorism by espousing so-called wars of national
liberation. Both Marx and Lenin made clear statements regarding the
question of the use and importance of terrorism to achieve political
ends,63 and later Soviet leaders have consistently supported terrorist vio-
lence. For example, Kruschev stated:
Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists....
Such wars are not only admissible, but inevitable. . . . We recognize
such wars, and we will help the peoples striving for their independence.
The Communists fully support such wars and march in the front rank
with peoples waging liberation struggles. 64
61 FIGHTING BACK, supra note 11, at 1. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1986, at 11. Libyan
support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is well documented. For example, a Tripoli Radio in
1972 announced: "We support the revolutionaries of Ireland who oppose Britain and are motivated
by nationalism and religion. The Libyan Arab Republic has stood by the revolutionaries of Ireland
... there are arms and there is support for the revolutionaries." INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, June 18,
1986, at 4. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL RPT. No. 138, LIBYA
UNDER QADHAFI: A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION (Jan. 1986). Adelman, Libya: A Source of Interna-
tional Terrorism, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. (Jan. 1982) 60; Goldberg, The Shoot-out at the Libyan Self-
styled People's Bureau: A Case of State Supported International Terrorism, 30 S.D.L. REV. 1 (Winter
1984).
62 E. Halperin, The Role of Cuba and of the Soviet Union, HYDRA OF CARNAGE, supra note 56,
at 125; C. STERLING, THE TERROR NETWORK (1981); DOBSON & PAYNE, THE TERRORISTS, THEIR
WEAPONS, LEADERS AND TACTICS (1982); Yariv, Arab Support for Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 73; de Vernisy, The New International Terrorism, WORLD PRESS REV.
23 (Nov. 1980); Livingstone & Arnold, supra note 47; N. LIVINGSTONE, THE WAR AGAINST TER-
RORISM (1982); House Foreign Affairs Committee, Review of the Presidential Certification of Nicara-
gua's Connection to Terrorism, Hearings, 96th Cong. 2d sem, 1980; E. HALPERIN, TERRORISM IN
LATIN AMERICA (1976); US. Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Security and Terrorism,
The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa,
March 1982, Vol. 1, 2; DEPTS. OF STATE AND DEFENSE, THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION IN
CENTRAL AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN (March 1985); Defector Describes Soviet Ties to Terror,
Wash. Times, June 18, 1986, at 4.
63 See GOREN, THE SOVIET UNION AND TERRORISM, ch. 1 (1984). Article 28 of the present
Soviet Constitution states that "the foreign policy of the USSR shall be aimed at... supporting the
struggle of peoples for national liberation .. " Introduction, HYDRA OF CARNAGE, supra note 56,
at xv.
64 Kruschev, quoted in HEINLE, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS 159
(1966).
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Premier Kosygin later made a similar statement:
The policy of peaceful coexistence... proceeds from the inadmissibil-
ity of the application of force in solving disputed questions among
states. But this in no case means the rejection of the right of peoples,
arms in hand, to oppose aggression or to strive for liberation from for-
eign oppression. The right is holy and inalienable and the Soviet
Union will, without fail, assist [all] peoples .... 65
The Soviet Union's support for terrorism is well documented;66 and
its involvement in sponsoring "liberation" wars67 constitutes a blatant
violation of the fundamental norms of the United Nations Charter. The
U.N. Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
Among States, 68 which is generally regarded as an authoritative interpre-
tation of the U.N. Charter, provides in pertinent part:
Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assist-
ing or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
69
65 Goren, infra note 68, at 96 and ch. 5 for various Soviet statements of active support for
terrorist groups. See also WAR & PEACE, supra note 44, 22-23.
66 Here too the material is voluminous and compelling. See, eg., Murphy & Brady, The Soviet
Union and International Terrorism, 16 INTL. LAw. 139 (Winter 1982); Moss, Terror: A Soviet
Export, N.Y. Times Mag., Nov. 2, 1980, at 42; Sterling, infra note 67; Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, First Session on
Terrorism: The Role of Moscow and its Subcontractors, June 26, 1981, Ser. No. 97-44 (1982); Al-
mond, The Legal Regulation of International Terrorism, 3 CONFLICT 143, 146-48 (1983); GOREN,
supra note 63; JACQUARD, LEs DOSSIERS SECRETS DU TERRORISM (1985) (In examining the net-
work of terrorism, the author found many terrorist organizations intertwined and concluded that the
Soviet Union is the major supervisor of terrorism); Defector Describes Soviet Ties to Terrors, Wash.
Times, June 18, 1986, at 4; Gozier, Soviet Support for International Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 64; R. Cline, Soviet Footprints in St. Peter's Square, 7 TERRORISM 53
(1984); CLINE & Y. ALEXANDER, TERRORISM: THE SOVIET CONNECTION (1984); Romerstein,
Political Doctrine and Apparatus, in HYDRA OF CARNAGE, supra note 56, at 59; Patterns of Global
Terrorism, supra note 11, at 4; PATrERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 11, at 14.
As one Soviet writer explained it: "Each nation has the sacred right to wage liberation war.., and
there can be no co-existence as far as this question is concerned. As before, the Soviet Union is
providing all-around support to the national liberation movements, thus demonstrating a profound
sense of internationalism typical of the Soviet people." Quoted in Romerstein, id. at 67.
67 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at 43, col. 4 referring to a diplomatic note the Soviet Union
delivered to the U.S. defending its rights to assist national movements of independence.
68 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 1970, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, SupP. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). See generally,
Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1974).
69 Id. Professor Blum has also argued that fomenting acts of terrorism by one state against
another is a violation of international law centering his argument around the 1951 Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (drawn up by the U.N. International Law
1987]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The Soviet Union is one of the few states which have expressly argued
that prohibitions against-much less criminal sanctions for-terrorist
acts should not apply to wars of national liberation.7'
It is undeniable that the Soviet Union favors projection of terrorist
violence across national borders-obviously an excellent tactic for pro-
moting its own political objectives. But, despite the well documented
evidence provided in Soviet doctrinal literature and political conduct,
statements of defectors, captured subversives and a wealth of analytical
literature provided by Western intelligence services, many observers have
instead chosen to accept assurances of noncomplicity from the Soviet
Union, and its client states and proxies. In view of the evidence, it is
hard to comprehend the reluctance to condemn those countries responsi-
ble for terrorist acts, particularly since it is primarily their support that
perpetuates international terrorism. Secretary Shultz stated this
succinctly:
One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the
terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups are in-
digenous to every society. But in many countries, terrorism would
long since have passed away had it not been for significant support
from outside. . . . The international links among terrorist groups are
now clearly understood; and the Soviet link, direct or indirect, is also
clearly understood. The Soviets use terrorist groups for their own pur-
poses, and their goal is always the same-to weaken liberal democracy
and undermine world stability.71
While the links between terrorist groups and their sponsors are self-
evident, we rarely have direct causal connectivity or linkage between a
recent terrorist outrage and the sponsoring state. This is partly due to a
decade of dismantling our human intelligence collecting capabilities since
the 1970s; but more importantly, it derives from the secretive nature of
international terrorism and the use of surrogates who leave few clues.
Commission) and the 1965 Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. Blum, The Beirut Raid and the
International Double Standard: A Reply to Professor Richard A. Falk 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (1970).
Article 2(6) of the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind prohibits:
The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of terrorist activities in
another state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state of organized activities calcu-
lated to carry out terrorist acts in another state.
Article 2 of the 1965 Declaration provides:
.*. no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, invite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state
.' Id.
70 See U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Observations of states Submitted in
accordance with G.A. Res. 3034 (xxvii), U.N. Doc. A/A.C.160/1 and adds. 1-5 (May-July 1973).
71 G. Shultz, Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 31, 32-33
(Aug. 1984).
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This severely hampers efforts aimed at "proving" the guilt of the spon-
sor. The standard of proof or "how much information is enough" to
affirm the complicity of a specific sponsoring state is unresolved; but,
whatever the standard, it will be based more on political factors than
legislation. In justifying a military response against a state sponsor as an
effective deterrent, a functional standard of guilt must be established to
provide a litmus test to determine whether the use of force is justified.72
The willingness of the United States, as demonstrated by the April 14,
1986, strike on Libya, to assert the right to act preemptively to defend its
citizens and interests against terrorism, necessitates an examination of
the legal justification for the use of force-one aspect of the legal frame-
work that would support a "pro-active" policy against international
terrorism.73
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR USING FORCE AGAINST STATE
SPONSORED TERRORISM: SELF-DEFENSE AND
PEACETIME REPRISALS
A. The Failure of Legal Controls to Curb International Terrorism
"Weak is the revolutionary who at a time of sharp struggle is stopped
by law's sanctity. In a period of transition, laws have but a temporary
signifance. If a law hinders the revolution's pace, the law must abro-
gated or corrected."
-V. Lenin 74
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the myriad legislative
efforts by states and the international community to stop international
72 For a discussion of state responsibility see I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NA-
TIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1983); I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 337-38, 365 (H. Lau-
terpacht, 8th ed. 1955). Unfortunately, in the case of terrorism, a careful application of the
principles of state responsibility will, in all likelihood mean that there will be few instances where it
can be conclusively established that a state controls or has collaborated with terrorist groups. Not
only is it difficult from an intelligence perspective to obtain the necessary evidence, the degree of
proof is so great that, except in obvious cases, the use of military force would always be ruled out.
Consequently, if a state desires to keep the use of force option open, a lesser standard, of necessity,
must prevail. Also, it should be noted that the intelligence gathering problem is a real one, but
beyond the scope of this article. See Roberts, Covert Responses: The Moral Dilemma, FIGHTING
BACK, supra note 11, at 133; Tovar, Active Responses, in HYDRA OF CARNAGE, supra note 56, at
231.
73 Since present U.S. policy does not allow a military response to terrorist attacks unless the
group and its sponsor are known with almost absolute certainty, many state supporters of terrorism
are instructing their surrogates not to issue proclamations taking responsibility for major attacks.
See Wash. Times, Sept. 29, 1986, at 3.
74 Lenin quoted in PARRY, supra note 12, at 156. Lenin is also quoted as saying: "The courts
must not ban terror-to promise that would be deception or self-deception-but must formulate the
motives underlying it, legalize it, as a principle, plainly, without any make-believe or embellish-
ment." Id. at 168.
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terrorism." Nevertheless, brief mention of those measures presently in
effect, or which have been proposed, is necessary to put the discussion of
the use of force by states against state sponsored terrorism in perspective.
It should be noted that any of the legal, political or moral rationales for
the use of force, discussed below, are premised on the exhaustion of all
other political and legal remedies.
Since at least 1937, governments and international organizations
have attempted to regulate, control and suppress terrorism. 76 There have
been numerous proposals for preventing and punishing terrorism; some
have been accepted by states,77 others have not.78 There are a number of
multilateral treaties to thwart aircraft hijacking and sabotage,79 attacks
on diplomats and other internationally protected persons, 8° use of the
mails for delivering explosives or other dangerous substances,81 theft of
nuclear materials,82 and prohibitions against hostage-taking.8 3 In addi-
75 The literature discussing legal measures, other than the use of force, is comprehensive and
impressive. See, e.g., J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAME-
WORK FOR POLICY INITIATIVES (1985); J. MURPHY & A. EVANS, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM (1978). For a compendium of the various treaties and conventions dealing with
terrorism and terrorist acts see R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM, DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
AND LEGAL CONTROL, Vois. I-III (1981); CONTROL OF TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL Docu-
MENTS (1979).
76 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Nov. 16 1937, 19 LEAGUE
OF NATIONS O.J. (1938) reprinted in Alexander, Id. at 19 (23 states signed, only India ratified). See
DOC. INTER-ALLIED INFORMATION COMM. (1942) Declaration of the Conference at St. James Pal-
ace, Jan. 13, 1942, reported in 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 84-85 (1943).
77 Two conventions that did gain acceptance were the OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of
International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 21 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413, and 1977 European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1972 (1976). For a discus-
sion of the European Convention see Warbrock, European Convention on Human Rights and the
Prevention of Terrorism, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 82 (1983).
78 Two of the most comprehensive proposals that have languished since first advocated are the
1972 U.S. Draft Convention on Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/c.6/L. 850 reprinted in I 1 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1382 (1972); and ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW, DIV.
OF PUBLIC SERVICE, Model American Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Serious
Forms of Violence (July 1983).
79 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S.
295, 3 Bevans 944; Convention on Offenses and Certain Oter Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6788; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking) Dec. 16, 1970 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) Sept. 23, 1971 24
U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
80 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
81 Art. 33, Constitution of the Universal Postal Convention, with Final Protocol, 16 U.S.T.
1291, T.I.A.S. No. 5881.
82 IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, reported in R. FRIED-
LANDER, supra note 75, Vol. III, at 583.
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tion, numerous bilateral agreements regarding aircraft hijacking and ex-
tradition have been signed in an attempt to stop hijacking and prevent
terrorists from hiding in another state as fugatives from "political" prose-
cution.84  There have been concerted efforts to strengthen extradition
laws to prevent terrorists from claiming their acts were "political" and
thus bar extradition. The most recent example of these efforts is the re-
cently ratified United Kingdom-United States treaty which severely re-
stricts recourse to the political offense exception.
With each new outrage, states attempt to assure themselves and
their citizens that they are achieving something by agreeing among them-
selves to undertake tougher measures against terrorist acts. These meas-
ures include the 1978 Declaration in Bonn,8 6 and the most recent
statement by the seven leading industrial nations attending the Tokyo
summit.8 7 These non-binding measures contain promises by each signa-
tory to undertake measures to limit the size of missions and restrict
travel of diplomats of states who are known or suspected of supporting
terrorists; to invoke stricter visa and immigration controls; and, to refuse
to export arms to states which support terrorism. In addition, bilateral
accords also have been signed whereby the parties agree to share infor-
mation and support various police operations against terrorists.8 8 Even
the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council managed
after the Vienna and Rome massacres to pass resolutions (non-binding)
condemning all acts of hostage-taking and abduction.8 9 Finally, states
83 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (signed Dec. 14, 1973).
84 For various bilateral aviation agreements, see J. MURPHY & A. EvANs, supra note 75. An
example of a successful bi-lateral accord is the Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of
Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses, Feb. 15, 1973, United States-Cuba, 24 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S.
No. 7579. There were no aerial hijackings between the two countries since the signing of the accord
in February 1973 (it has since expired). See R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 75, at 96 (1979).
85 The U.S. Senate consented to ratification on July 17, 1986. The British Parliament accepted
with minor modifications and exchange of formal instruments of ratification is expected soon. This
was confirmed in an Oct. 2, 1986 telephone conversation between the author and Ms. L. Allder,
Dept. of State, Office of the Legal Advisor (Treaty Affairs). See Report of the Committee on Interna-
tional Terrorism, Proceedings and Committee Report of the American Branch of the International
Law Association, at 126 (1985-86). U.S. Courts have also been willing to carve out a "wanton crimes
exception" to the political crimes defense. See Abu Cain v. Wilks, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981);
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986). Specifically, the political crimes defense will be
denied to persons who commit wanton and indiscriminate violence against persons not involved in
armed hostilities.
86 See Busuttil, Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism: A Non-binding International
Agreement on Aircraft Hijacking, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 474 (1982).
87 Terrorism Must Be Fought, Wash. Post, May 6, 1986, at A14.
88 See, eag., Italy and U.S. Sign Accord to Fight Terrorism Together, Wash. Times, June 25,
1986, at 8B.
89 G.A. Res. 40/6/, 9 Dec. 1985; U.N. SCOR Res. 579, adopted by the Security Council at its
2637th meeting on 18 Dec. 1985.
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have undertaken to strengthen their domestic laws to provide for univer-
sal or long-arm jurisdiction over terrorist offenses to its nationals or in
keeping with international conventions and to enhance the penalties for
terrorist acts. 90
But despite these efforts and more current efforts under considera-
tion to use law in the war on terrorism, there has been little success. As
Judge Sofaer has stated: "The law has a poor record in dealing with
international terrorism. The terrorist who is prosecuted is likely to be
released far earlier than his sentence should require, often in exchange
for hostages taken in a subsequent terrorist episode." 91 While more laws
are needed, we cannot delude ourselves that closing "gaps" will over-
come the problems that hinder law enforcement against terrorists. Re-
cent events have demonstrated that "even when laws clearly govern
particular conduct, they are often disregarded or otherwise fail to achieve
their purpose." z If the primary function of law is to deal with problems
in an orderly fashion, then the international legal system does not work
to combat terrorism. As Judge Sofaer and others have correctly ob-
served, it appears that international law is unable to deal with the nature
of the problem. "Without the proper enforcement procedures, strongly
worded statutes are not much help. The old common law adage that a
law badly enforced is worse than no law at all still holds true."9
The hollow formalism of the law arguably offers, if anything, even
less help than no law at all. Ingenious schemes for new international
tribunals and procedures have been proposed, 94 but they completely miss
90 For example, a bill presently before Congress, The Terrorist Prosecution Act of 1986, S.
1429, would establish U.S. criminal jurisdiction over certain violent offenses, including murder, man-
slaughter, assault, and kidnapping committed against U.S. nationals anywhere in the world in the
course of a terrorist incident. See 44 CONG. Q. 477 (1986) (Senate passed the bill 92-0). Numerous
other measures have been proposed by the administration and other members of Congress. See
President Proposes Legislation to Counter Terrorism, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL 65 (June 1984); S. 1373,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 2335 (would exempt counter terrorism military action from the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution), 44 CONG. Q. 1021-24 (1986). See also summary of
various initiatives before Congress in 44 CONG. Q. 505, 849 (1986) and the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act Conference Report, 132 CONG. REC. Vol. 112, at SI 1424-27 (Aug. 13,
1986).
91 Sofaer, supra note 15, at 901.
92 Id. at 902. See also Sofaer, letter in N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1986, at A24 regarding the inter-
ception of the Egypt airplane carrying Achille Lauro hijackers.
93 Friedlander, Coping with Terrorism: What is to be Done? TERRORISM: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 238 (1979).
94 One solution, repeatedly stressed, is the desirability of an international criminal court and
related organizations. See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, A DRAFT INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL CODE (1980); Bridge, The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice
and the Formulation of International Criminal Law, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1255 (1964); STONE,
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1976); Sundberg, The Case for an International Criminal
Court, 37 J. INT'L L. & COMM. 211 (1971); Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 AM.
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the point. The manifest unwillingness of many governments to use ex-
isting legal remedies, e.g., Egypt's failure to prosecute the Achille Lauro
hijackers) against terrorists demonstrates that the real problem is the
lack of a will, not the lack of a way. While many governments are ready
and willing to take firm action within existing laws, and to examine other
stronger legal remedies, many are not. Until all states agree to live by
their treaty commitments and to accept a world society in which terrorist
acts are not accepted as a legitimate tool to further state ends, states must
look to methods other than the use of international law to stop terrorism.
One of those methods is the use of force as a self-help measure.
B. Legal Regulation of the Right to Self-Help: Aggression, Self-
Defense and Peacetime Reprisals95
"Between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds, I
see no remedy except force."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes96
1. Aggression
The use of force against state sponsors of terrorism must be pre-
mised on acts of aggression by the state sponsor. Prior to 1974, there was
little international agreement as to what constitutes unlawful aggression.
However, in 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by
consensus, a resolution on aggression which included the following
definition:
J. INT'L L. 37 (1950). Cf Smith, The Probable Necessity of an International Prison in Solving Air-
craft Hiacking, 5 INT'L LAW. 269 (1971).
95 The purpose of this article is to analyze the use of self-defense and peacetime reprisals as
legitimate methods of self-help in combatting terrorism. However, it should be noted that there are
other theories of self-help measures, most prominent of these being humanitarian intervention to
protect a state's citizens and to ensure the preservation of fundamental human rights. E. STOWELL,
INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921); INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS (1984);
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1973); F. DELIMA, INTERVENTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). See also discussion regarding "rectification" in Sheehan,
Principles of Self-help, 2 FLETCHER FOR., 135; A. Rubin, Terrorism and Social Control: An
International Law Perspective, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 60, 67-68 (1979); Discussion, Control of
Terrorism in International Life: Cooperation and Self-help, 71 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 17, 31
(1977). Rectification is analogous to the general principle of the domestic law of restitution and
quasi-contract. A state's right of rectification comes into play when it is injured as a result of a
second state's failure to perform its acknowledged legal duty. For example, the failure of Egypt to
prosecute the Achille Lauro hijackers, allowing them to fly to a safe haven, in contravention of its
legal responsibilities under the Hostage Taking Convention (to which it is a party), would have given
the injured state (the United States) a limited right to "rectify" the situation by directly performing
the legal obligation neglected by the delinquent state; i.e. capture and prosecute the terrorists.
96 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollack, quoted in Livingstone, Proac-
tive Responses to Terrorism, FIGHTING BACK, supra note 11, at 130.
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The use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or political independence of another state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
definition.
97
Article 2 of the Resolution sets forth the principles of priority and ag-
gressive intent, stating that the first use of armed force by a state in con-
travention of the United Nations Charter will constitute aprimafacie act
of aggression. Article 3 lists several specific acts which constitute aggres-
sion, including acts which are associated with attacks initiated by state
sponsored terrorists. For example, acts of aggression include:
(f) the action of a state in allowing its territory, which it has placed
at the disposal of another state, to be used by that other state for perpe-
trating an act of aggression against a third state;
(g) the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another state or such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above
[blockade, bombardment, invasion], or its substantial involvement
therein.98
In addition, Article 4 provides that the acts enumerated in Article 3 are
not exhaustive; and the Security Council is free to determine that other
acts constitute aggression under the Charter. Article 5 further provides
that no consideration, be it political, economic, military or otherwise, is
to serve as a justification for aggression. A war of aggression, according
to Article 5, is a crime against international peace, with aggression giving
rise to international responsibility.99 While obviously this definition of
aggression falls far short of legal perfection," °° the formulation of tests
and criteria directs one's attention to the aggressive nature of conduct by
a particular state. No enumeration of aggressive acts could be exhaus-
tive; therefore focus was placed instead on the initiation of hostilities and
aggressive intent.'0° Thus, one useful test of aggression consists of the
97 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/963 (1974), art. 1.
Since at least the 1920s, a serious effort has been underway to assign a definite legal context to the
word "aggression." See e.g. 1933 Convention of the Definition of Aggression, signed July 3, 1933,
147 L.N.T.S. 69 (1933); 1954 Soviet Draft for the Definition of Aggression, 51 U.N. GAOR Annex 9
at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.332/Rev. 1.
98 Id. Indirect aggression is discussed in detail in 1 FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE, 3-46 (1975). See also STONE, CONFLICT
THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO AGGRESSION (1977).
99 The difficulty of obtaining Security Council condemnation of aggression as well as collective,
effective action against aggression was aptly demonstrated in the Falklands/Malvinas War. See
Arend, The Falklands War and the Failure of the International Legal Order in THE FALKLANDS
WAR 52 (1985).
100 Art. 7, for example, implies that liberation movements have the right to receive outside
assistance in their struggle. Cf. Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 224 (1976).
101 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at art. 2.
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existance of repeated refusals to seek a settlement by peaceful means.
One problem with the aforementioned definition is its requirement
that "armed bands" or terrorists to carry out their acts of aggression
before a state can legitimately respond in self-defense. Consequently, the
preparatory stages of dispatching attackers do not by themselves amount
to an act of aggression. Thus, no act of aggression has occurred until
there has been an actual attack against another state attributable to ter-
rorists operating from the territory of the supporting state.1 "2 Limiting
aggression to an actual attack ignores the quality and nature of weapons
available to terrorists today, especially those sponsored by a state. Use of
terrorist groups or other armed bands to coerce another state into vari-
ous courses of action was recognized early on as "indirect aggression," a
difficult aspect of aggression to address. The use and characteristics of
this form of aggression were succinctly noted in 1961 by Professors Mc-
Dougal and Feliciano:
A chief characteristic of 'indirect aggression' appears to be the vicari-
ous commission of hostile acts by the aggressor states through the me-
dium of third party groups located within the target state and
composed either of foreigners or national[s] of the target ostensibly
acting on their own initiative. The hostile acts may include the giving
of aid and support and, frequently, strategic and tactical direction to
rebellious internal groups.
The assistance given to internal groups may frequently assume more
covert and subtle forms, including the training, exportation and financ-
ig of leaders and specialists in subversion, sabotage, infiltration, fo-
mentation of civil violence, and coups d'etat. 'Indirect aggression,'
disguised as a purely domestic change, presents Peculiar difficulties for
external decision-makers (footnotes ommitted). '
It is unreasonable to expect a state to await an attack on its forces or
citizens before taking action against those planning the attack. While
"preparatory or threatening" acts by individuals cannot be used. as a pre-
text for the use of retaliatory force against a state not clearly tied to the
terrorist group; nevertheless, as a practical matter, a state cannot, nor
should it, be required to wait an actual terrorist attack if it holds con-
vincing evidence of an imminent attack. Whether preparing for an at-
tack or actually carrying out acts of terrorism is involved, support of
these activities fits squarely into the U.N. definition of aggression. Al-
lowing terrorists to operate in one's territory, or training, equipping, and
transporting terrorists to another state to commit terroristic ' acts should
fit squarely within the spirit, if not the letter, of the U.N. Resolution on
Aggression. If a state uses terrorist surrogates, it is using armed force
102 RIFATT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 272 (1979).
103 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 190 (1961).
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against another state; and that is aggression. Consequently, Judge Sofaer
could reasonably conclude, that "[b]y providing material support to ter-
rorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged in armed
aggression against the United States under established principle of inter-
national law, just as if he [Libyan leader Qadhafi] had used its own
forces." 1" The existance of an act of aggression which would justify a
response leads next to a review of the international law under which
force may be used as a response.
2. U.S. Policy on Using Force
"Diplomatic methods are fine, but we will never give up the gun
till[sic] we've achieved our goal."
-PLO Terrorist 105
The bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut on October
23, 1983, was dramatic and horrific and clearly demonstrated how effec-
tively governments could use terrorism to achieve their goals. The attack
provoked an intense debate in the United States about its role in the Leb-
anon peacekeeping process. Additionally, it demonstrated how vulnera-
ble U.S. forces are to this form of attack. The Long Commission
concluded with regard to the importance of terrorism as a strategic
weapon of violence that "terrorist warfare can have significant impact
and demonstrates that the United States and specifically the Department
of Defense is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat. Much needs
to be done, on an urgent basis, to prepare U.S. military forces to defend
against and counter terrorist warfare."10 6
One response was a determination that the United States needed "an
active defense," 107 whereby the United States "must be prepared to retal-
iate-selectively." °8 The use of military force as a form of deterrence
and a recommended U.S. policy against terrorists, notwithstanding with
U.S. strike on Libya, remains a contentious domestic issue.109 Secretary
of Defense Weinberger in a November 28, 1984, speech outlined six tests
that the United States would apply when deciding whether to send mili-
tary forces into combat (against terrorists) abroad:
104 Sofaer, supra note 15, at 921.
105 SCHREIBER, THE ULTIMATE WEAPON: TERRORISTS AND WORLD ORDER 138 (1978).
106 Long Commission Report, supra note 4, at 3.
107 Shultz urges 'Active' Drive on Terrorism, Wash. Post, June 25, 1984. See also The Scherr
Lecture, supra note 17.
108 Schlesinger, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RPT., Feb. 18, 1985, at 46. See also Wash. Post, Feb.
7, 1985, at A32.
109 The 1984-85 debate between Secretary Shultz, who advocated the use of force, and Secre-
tary of Defense Weinberger, who warned of the need for extreme prudence in utilizing armed force,
was well publicized. See U.S. NEWS AND WORLD Rvr., Dec. 24, 1984, at 20-21.
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1. The act must be vital to U.S. interests.
2. We must be prepared to fight "wholeheartedly with the clear in-
tention of winning."
3. The military and political objectives must be clearly defined; and
we must have the means to achieve them.
4. There must be "reasonable assurance" of support by Congress and
the public.
5. Forces will be committed only as a "last resort."
6. Finally, we must be ready to continually re-evaluate and "adjust if
necessary" the need to continue a military operation.
110
However, the Secretary later noted that the most appropriate way to deal
with terrorism "is to do things that discourage, deter, prevent it, [and]
diminish it in the future" which could include the use of force."'
Despite Weinberger's caution, the U.S. commitment to use force
was made clear by disclosure of a still classified presidential directive on
terrorism, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, signed by
President Reagan on April 3, 1984. NSDD 138 "represents a quantum
leap in countering terrorism, from the reactive mode to recognition that
pro-active steps are needed.""' 2 Former Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane suggested that the policy
included the following key elements:
1. The practice of terrorism under all circumstances is a threat to the
national security of the United States;
2. The practice of international terrorism must be resisted by all legal
means;
3. State-sponsored terrorism consists of acts hostile to the United
States and to global security and must be resisted by all legal
means;
4. The United States has a responsibility to take protective measures
whenever there is evidence that terrorism is about to be commit-
ted; and
5. The threat of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression and justi-
fies acts of self-defense.' 3
Since the use of force to combat terrorism now appears to be ac-
cepted U.S. policy," 4 the regulation of that force must be considered in
light of both the more traditionally accepted views on the use of force to
respond to aggression, and the developing perspectives on how military
force can be used within a legal regime that accepts its use only as a last
resort.
110 Weinberger, The Use of Military Power, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1984, at Al.
I1! Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 17, 1986, at 8.
112 Pre-emptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1984, at 19 (statement of
Noel Koch, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs).
113 Address of Robert McFarlane, supra note 23.
114 See J. Whitehead, Counterterrorism Policy, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 79 (June 1986).
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3. The Customary Law of Self-Defense and the UN Charter
"When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he
has struck before you crush him."
-Franklin D. Roosevelt"15
In the field of international law, one of the most significant twentieth
century developments has been the legal regulation of the formerly un-
regulated privilege of states to use force. The League of Nations Cove-
nant placed primary emphasis on restricting the right of member states
to resort to war, either in breach of certain obligations connected with
accepting the arbitration or judicial settlement of certain disputes, or the
recommendations thereon of the League of Nations Council.16 In the
Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928,117 state parties generally agreed to re-
nounce recourse to "war" to solve international disagreements, and as an
instrument of national policy. Disputes or conflicts between the parties
were to be settled by "peaceful means." But despite attempts to re-
nounce war, states have never rejected the right of a state to use force in
self-defense.
As previously noted, there is widespread agreement that the United
States must develop military responses to terrorism. Force directed
against states sponsoring terrorism may be justified as self-defense.
Traditional international law recognizes the right of a state to use force
in self-defense when responding to the threat or use of force. The pur-
pose of self-defense is to protect the "essential" rights of territorial integ-
rity and political independence necessary to the existence of a state, while
at the same time encouraging the peaceful settlement of disputes."' Cu s-
tomary or traditional law on self-defense prescribes the use of peaceful
procedures, if they are available, as the first requirement of self-defense.
Once peaceful means are exhausted, use of force in self-defense must be
justified on the basis of actual necessity, as opposed to pretense or sham;
and the responding force must be proportional to the initial use of
force.' 19 These prerequisites were stated in the now classic formulation
of the right of self-defense offered by Secretary of State Daniel Webster to
Great Britain's Lord Ashburton in the Caroline affair. 120
115 Fireside Chat of Roosevelt, Sept. 11, 1941, quoted in HEINLE, supra note 64, at 247.
116 See arts. 12-15, Covenant of the League of Nations, reprinted in 6 G. HACKWORTH, DI-
GEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-23 (1961).
117 More accurately, the Paris General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
118 See Mallison & Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack ofJune 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqui Nuclear
Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 419 (1982).
119 Id. at 419-20.
120 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906). Briefly, British solders had
invaded American territory, boarded the ship Caroline, and sent it to its destruction over the Niag-
ara Falls. The British claimed that the men aboard the ship, located on U.S. soil, were preparing to
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In Secretary Webster's view, self-defense was justified only when the
"necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." '121 The Caroline inci-
dent stands for the proposition that a state has a right of self-defense
against hostile activities originating from a second state, including the
right to invade the territory of the state harboring the hostile forces. The
territorial integrity of the second state must temporarily give way to the
threatened state's right to self-defense.122 Self-defense is justified as a
preventive, not a retaliatory action.1 23
Later writings of scholars and the practice of states established,
based on the Caroline case, four prerequisites for the use of force in self-
defense:
1. An infringement or threatened infringement of the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of the defending state;
2. The failure or inability of the other state to prevent the
infringement;
3. The absence of alternative means to secure protection; and
4. The strict limitation of the defending state's use of force to prevent
danger. 124
Consequently, the customary right of a state to use force in self-defense
justifies actions against terrorists located in another state that is either
unwilling or unable to stop the terrorist activities. 125 State practice and
participate in and aid the activities of insurgents in British controlled Canada. They then justified
their actions on the basis of self-defense. Although the diplomatic correspondence which followed
failed to agree on the facts, the exchange did agree on the standard by which a claim of self-defense
should be judged. See id. at 410-14.
121 Id. See also Letter from Secretary Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841) reprinted in 29
BRIT. AND FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840-41); Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases,
22 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
122 One expert reads The Caroline as supporting "the right of self-defense of a state against
hostile actions proceeding from another's jurisdiction ... [and] [t]he failure of a government to
prevent harmful acts of private persons against foreign states can legally be met by the exercise of the
rise of self-defense on the part of the menaced community, and this right extends to the invasion of
the territory in which the hostile act originated." M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR HOSTILE ACm OF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 32 (1962). Thus, if a
state harboring terrorists is unwilling or unable to suppress them, its "right of territorial integrity
must yield to the right of self-defense of the states against whom the bands are directing their activi-
ties. Implicit in this assertion is the recognition that the right of territorial integrity is by no means
absolute but must give way to the apparently stronger right of self-defense of the threatened commu-
nity." Id. at 116.
123 See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 426 (6th ed. 1963) (Citing the Corfu Channel case
for the proposition that retaliation is illegal but use of force to prevent "expected unlawful" acts was
legitimate).
124 See, eg., Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 ACAD. DE DROIT INT'L RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 463-64 (1952); D. BOWETr, SELF-
DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 185-86 (1958).
125 Mere toleration of a terrorist group would not be enough to conclude that there was a
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international publicists before World War II agreed that self-defense
against hostile armed bands was legitimate.12 6 However, actions in self-
defense had to be limited to attacks on those armed groups in host states
that were physically unable to control the groups. 127 For example, in
1818 the United States invoked the doctrine of self-defense to justify the
use of American troops to suppress hostile Indian bands in Spanish west-
ern Florida. The Secretary of State instructed the U.S. Minister to Spain
to stress that U.S. forces crossed the border "not in a spirit of hostility to
Spain, but as a necessary measure of self-defense." The territory would
be restored to Spanish control whenever Spain indicated that it was "able
and willing to fulfill [its duty] of restraining by force the Florida Indians
from hostilities against [American] citizens. 128 The American position in
confronting latter day terrorists emanating from adjacent territory rested
on "the immutable principles of self-defense-upon the principles which
justify decisive measures of precaution to prevent irrepairable[sic] evil to
our own or its neighboring people." 129 Under this legal regime, a state
unable to prevent its territory from being used as a launching pad for
attacks against another state was not entitled to full respect for its territo-
rial integrity. It had to submit to defensive measures if it could not po-
lice its own territory. As Professor Hyde explained:
The reasonableness of the claim of a state that respect be paid to its
supremacy within its domain, as well as to its political independence,
depends upon its success in satisfying the full measure of its obligation
growing out of activities within its territory which are productive of a
direct effect upon foreign states and their nationals. 130
substantial level of state complicity. "However, as government complicity with terrorists increases
from toleration to incitement, fomentation and support, the government actions begins to resemble
and 'armed attack,' possibly legitimizing defensive responses." Note, Controlling International Ter-
rorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force and Proposals for Multinational Cooperation, 8 U. TOL. L.
REV. 209 (1976).
126 M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 122, at 114-15.
127 Bowett, supra note 124, at 56.
128 2 J. MOORE, supra note 120, at 405-06.
129 Instructions from the Secretary of State to the Minister for Mexico (Dec. 10, 1836), re-
printed in id., at 420.
130 I. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-14 (1922). U.S. intrusions across the border into
Mexico to hunt down and destroy armed bands in 1912 was also justified under a right of self-
defense "superior in the particular circumstances to the right of territorial inviolability." Report of
Secretary of War Commission to Investigate Claims of Americans for Damages Suffered Within
American Territory From Insurrection in Mexico, reprinted in II 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (1941). In this situation, the U.S. went to great lengths to stress that
under "no circumstances will [U.S. troops] be suffered to trench in any degree upon the sovereignty
of Mexico or develop into intervention of any kind into the internal affairs of our sister republic."
Letter from the Amrican Secretary of State to a representative of the Mexican Government of March
13, 1916, reprinted in id., at 292. See also Letter from Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador
(Aug. 26, 1919), reprinted in id., at 300. More recently, other countries have also claimed a similar
right of self-defense. See Prime Minister Begin's statement to the Israeli Knesset (May 7, 1979),
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In sum, customary law accepted and permitted reasonable and nec-
essary acts of self-defense premised on a compelling threat and an over-
whelming necessity to act. 3 ' However, the question remains whether
the exercise of self-defense prior to an actual attack is inconsistent with
present law. This law is reflected in the UN Charter which has severely
restricted a state's recourse to the use of force to resolve international
disputes.
The aim of the United Nations is "to ensure, by acceptance of prin-
ciples, and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used
save in the common interest." '132 Furthermore, Article 2(4) requires that
all members "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." '133 The use of
force under the Charter is enunciated in Article 51 which preserves "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member....
Legal scholarship is far from reaching agreement on the limitation
Articles 2(4) and 51 place on the use of force in self-defense. There are
essentially two schools of thought as to their interpretation. The "re-
strictive" view asserts that resort to force by a UN member is unlawful,
regardless of any wrongs or dangers that provoked it, unless it is (1) for
self-defense against an armed attack, or (2) collective action pursuant to
competent decisions of the UN organs. Thus, if neither of these forms of
quoted by Ambassador Blum in his speech to the Security Council (May 31, 1979), 34 U.N. SCOR
(2146th plen. mtg.) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV 2146 (1979); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 241-42 (1963) (Soviet Union's invocation of the right of self-
defense.).
131 See, eg., 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 47 (1971); M. McDOUGAL
& F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 231-32 (1961).
132 United Nations Charter, preamble, para. 1, 3 Bevans 697; reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW I (Brownlie ed. 1967).
133 "The broad effect of Article 2(4) is... that it entirely prohibits the use of threat of armed
force against another state except in self-defense or in execution of collective measures authorized by
the council or assembly." BRIERLY, supra note 123, at 415. See Wright, The Legality of Intervention
Under the United Nations Charter, 51 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 88 (1957). Professor Brierly ob-
served that "the truth is, that the Charter, while it mentions 'justice' in its preamble and in Article
2(3), does not occupy itself very much with insuring that 'justice' as distinct from 'peace' shall
prevail among members of the United Nations." J. BRIERLY, supra note 123, at 414.
134 Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be imme-
diately reported to the Security Council and shall not be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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relief are available, the member state would have to submit indefinitely,
without redress, to the continuance of these wrongs. 135 This view has
been bolstered by UN practice which has consistently refused to recog-
nize a right of preventive or anticipatory self-defense "for fear that it may
be too fraught with danger for the basic policy of peace and stability."' 136
The "restrictive" view is best summarized by Professor Henkin who
underscored the necessity for a strict interpretation of Article 51:
But anyone reading the article, as a lawyer or as a layman, would read
the article as permitting an exception only if armed attack occurs.
The reasons why these provisions, as interpreted, were made the heart
of the Charter are not a mystery. The nations coming out of a second
World War concluded that, despite inadequacies in international law
and order, force was no longer tolerable; injustice would have to be
dealt with, changes would have to be achieved, by other means. An
exception to the ban on force, to permit self-help in the case of armed
attack, was inevitable and just.... But the exception was deliberately
made clear and narrow. Armed attack is an objective fact, compara-
tively easy to prove, difficult to fabricate.... Exceptions beyond that,
however, would tend to destroy the rule. Even an extension to "antici-
patory self-defense" would open the floodgates to fabrication ... to
paranoia... to confusion of aggressor and victim in every situation of
tension in a conflict-ridden world. 137
Nevertheless, however reasonable the restrictive interpretation of self-de-
fense may have seemed when Article 51 was adopted, in a world, where
the norm was indirect attacks by the use of terrorist surrogates, today
such an interpretation is unrealistic and dangerous. It must be rejected
for several reasons.
First, the "restrictive view" ignores the special problems inherent in
counter-insurgency self-defense. States confronted with attacks consist-
ing of terrorist bombings, hijackings and other criminal acts have limited
135 J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 94-95 (1958). It should be noted that, argu-
ing on the basis of the traveaux preparatoire, Professor Stone rejects the restrictive interpretation of
Article 51. Id. at 98.
136 R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 203 (1963).
137 Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 57 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 147, 166 (1963). Professor Jessup also rejected "anticipatory self-defense"
stating that "[u]nder the Charter, alarming military preparations by a neighboring state would jus-
tify a resort to the Security Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state
which believed itself threatened." P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 165-66 (1948). See also
I. Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 240 (1961); Skubijzewski,
Use of Force by States, Collective Security, Law of War and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (M. Sorenson ed. 1968) 739; R. Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under
Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29 (1951); Q. Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 546, 559 (1963). Contra, J. STONE supra note 135; J. BRIERLY, supra note 123, at 413-21.
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options. The choice is either directly destroying terrorist training camps
and bases or inflicting injury upon the host government to induce it to
suppress or curtail terrorist activities. In either instance, the target state
will appear to be making a disproportionate response because the scale is
large, the operation overt, and the action undertaken by the regular gov-
ernment military forces government in the territory of a foreign state. 13 8
Secondly, it is illogical to limit the right of self-defense to armed
attacks. Fundamental threats to the existence of a state may be under-
taken without resort to armed attacks; and conversely, the necessity of
defending a nation may arise without being attacked. Professor Bowett
criticized the restrictive interpretation as follows: "The substantive
rights to which self-defense pertains and for which it serves as a means of
self-protection are: a) The Right of Territorial Integrity, b) The Right of
Political Independence, c) The Right of Protection Over Nationals, [and]
d) Certain Economic Rights." '139 For example, a condition requiring
self-defense can arise due to non-military coercion such as the imposition
of economic embargoes or boycotts. Consequently, Professor McDougal
argues:
To say.., that Article 51 limits the appropriate precipitating event for
lawful self-defense to an 'armed attack' is in effect to suppose that in no
possible context can applications of non-military types of coercion...
take on efficacy, intensity, and proportions comparable to those of an
'armed attack' and thus present an analogous condition of necessity. 140
A fortiori, when the coercion consists of military measures just short of
an armed attack, a state should be entitled to protect itself.
Most importantly, the adoption of the restricted interpretation gives
rise to the anomalous situation of UN members being left remediless in
the face of "all kinds of illegality, injustice and inhumanity as long as
these do not take the specific form of an 'armed attack' under Article
51." 141 This occurs because the fundamental predicate for the restricted
right of self-defense-a reasonably operative Security Council- has
never come to pass. Article 51 envisions self-defense as an interim right,
to be exercised only until the Security Council assumes responsibility for
resolving the dispute and restoring the peace. But, history has shown
that the Security Council is incapable of assuming this role. As one
scholar observed:
The reduction of self-defense to an interim right was made on the as-
sumption that the international quasi-order, which was to be estab-
138 Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law ofRetaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415,426
(1969). See also D. BoWErr, supra note 124, at 10 (Special problems of counter-guerilla warfare).
139 D. BowE-r, supra note 124, at 270.
140 M. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 240-41.
141 J. STONE, supra note 135, at 99.
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lished by the United Nations, would normally work. The Security
Council was to exercise the utmost freedom in determining what
amounted to a threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression,
including armed attack. If, therefore, the Security Council fails to ful-
fill its appointed function, this task falls back on the individual mem-
bers of the United Nations. 142
Recent events, such as the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the Iran-
Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Vietnamese aggression
against Cambodia, have shown that prohibition of resort to force, in the
absence of an effectively functioning Security Council, is ludicrous and
chimerical. The Security Council has proven itself ineffective due to
political bias and paralysis in the face of superpower confrontation.
What is left is the incongruity of subjecting a state to coercion while
denying it a fair hearing (or any hearing at all) at the Security Council.
A state faced with coercion short of an armed attack would most cer-
tainly, under the restrictive view, be left without any effective right to
protect its own citizens.143 This view must be rejected as unresponsive to
the realities of a world lacking an impartial, smoothly functioning Secur-
ity Council where states engage with impunity in terrorist acts against
each other. As Sir Humphrey Waldock cogently stated: "[A] legal sys-
tem which merely prohibits the use of force and does not make adequate
provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes invites failure." 1"
A more compelling and rational interpretation of the Charter's pro-
scription on the use of force argues that it leaves intact the right of self-
defense as it existed in prior customary international law. For example,
several scholars have argued that Article 51 does not restrict the right of
self-defense "to cases falling precisely within the words in Article 51 'if
an armed attack occurs;'" rather the import of Article 51 seems to be
that the "inherent" or customary international law right of self-defense
remains unimpaired. 4 ' Similarly, while authorities disagree on what
sort of "armed attack" is sufficient to trigger a self-defense response;1 46
142 Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 ACAD. DE DROIT
INT'L RECUEIL DEs COuRS 195, 338 (1955).
143 It appears that the International Court of Justice retains the restrictive interpretation of
armed attack: "The Court does not believe that the concept 'armed attack' includes assistance to
rebels in the form of provisions of weapons or logistical or other support." ICJ Judgment: Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), re-
printed in 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 785, 795 (1986).
144 Waldock, supra note 124, at 456.
145 J. BRIERLY, supra note 123, at 413-21. See also J. STONE, supra note 135; Skubijzewski
supra note 137; Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Col-
lective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335, 362-63 (1962);
McDougal, "The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense," 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 600 (1963).
146 On the other hand, one author argued that if "armed attack" means illegal armed attack it
means any illegal armed attack, even a small border incident .. " Kunz, Individual and Collective
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ultimately, the existance of an "armed attack" by armed bands of ter-
rorists depends on difficult questions of fact as to what is necessary for
the protection of certain essential state interests. Since the Charter does
not define the term "armed attack," it is submitted that UN members
may, in exercising their rights of individual or collective defense, legiti-
mately interpret armed attack as not only an action in which a state uses
its armed forces, but also employs terrorist groups. Resolution of these
questions rests with the target state since that state's territorial integrity,
independence or citizens are at risk.14 7
Under customary international law, convincing evidence of prepara-
tion for an armed attack triggers the right of self-defense recognized by
the UN Charter. Sir Waldock argues:
Article 51, however, speaks only of an inherent right of self-defense, if
an armed attack occurs.... [This does not] cut down the customary
right and make it applicable only to the case of resistance to an armed
attack by another state.... [Nor does it] restrict forcible self-defense
to cases where the attack provoking it has actually been launched.
Where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential
danger but of an armed attack being actually mounted, then an armed
attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the
frontier. 148
With respect to attacks on terrorist camps, bases and their means of
support, the use of force in self-defense is arguably not against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of another state, nor inconsistent
with the spirit or letter of the UN Charter.149 This interpretation of Ar-
ticle 2(4) is consistent with the decision in the 1949 Corfu Channel
Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947).
Contra, Skubijzewski, supra note 137, at 777.
147 Professor McDougal views the issue as follows: "In broadest formulation, [the] right of
self-defense, as established by traditional practice, authorizes a state which, being a target of activi-
ties by another state, reasonably decides. . ., that such activities imminently require it to employ the
military instrument to protect its territorial integrity and political independence ...." McDougal,
supra note 145, at 597-98. The British sinking of French naval vessels in Oran, French North Africa
during World War II, the United State quarantine in connection with the Cuban missile cris of 1962,
and the attack on Libya in 1986 by the United States were all justified as acts of self-defense to
defend the security of the target state from an imminent threat. See I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 72, at
303 (British acts against the French); Mallison, supra note 145, at 423 (Cuban missile crisis); U.S.
Exercises Right of Self-Defense Against Libyan Terrorism, 86 DEP'T ST. BuLL. I (June 1986) (U.S.
Attack on Libya).
148 Waldock, supra note 124, at 496-98.
149 Article 2(4), it may be recalled, requires all members to refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence" of
any other state, or "in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, U.N.
CHARTER art, 2, para. 4.
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case.'"I The International Court of Justice permitted the use of force in
the face of a strong probability of armed attack. It also found use of
defensive force intended to assert rights illegally denied consistent with
Article 2(4).
The customary formulation of the right of self-defense allowed re-
sort to force only if the necessity was "instant, overwhelming, and leav-
ing no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." Some
international scholars view the limitation of self-defense to cases requir-
ing instant and immediate response as a central element of legitimate
self-defense. One writer stresses that the need for self-defense must be
instant and therefore does not cover "(a) either preventive measures
against remote future contingencies of (b) retaliatory measures against
past offenses which are unlikely to be repeated in the immediate
future."' 51
This interpretation is overly restrictive and fails to accept the reali-
ties of modern international relations. As Professor McDougal has
explained:
Even the highly restrictive language of Secretary of State Webster in
the Caroline case, specifying a 'necessity of self-defense, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for delibera-
tion,' did not require "actual armed attack," and the understanding is
now widespread that a test formulated in the previous century for a
controversy between two friendly states is hardly relevant to corn-
temporary controversies, involving high expectations of violence, be-
tween nuclear-armed protagonists. The requirement of
proportionality, in further expression of the policy of minimizing coer-
cion, stipulates that the responding use of the military instrument by
the target state be limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reason-
ably necessary promptly to secure the permissible objectives of self-
defense under the established conditions of necessity.
It has indeed been accepted principle that a target state may make a
first, provisional decision that the conditions of necessity are such as to
require it immediately to employ the military instrument for preserva-
tion of its territorial integrity and political independence. Given the
continuing ineffectiveness of the general community organization to
act quickly and certainly for the protection of states, no other principle
150 Corfu Channel case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 123, at 421;
Waldock, supra note 124, at 501.
151 "A threat and, indeed, use of force-the demonstration of naval force in Albania's territo-
rial waters [the subject of the Corfu Channel casel-is not contrary to Article 2(4) when it is affirma-
tion of rights which have been illegally and forcibly denied .... It is enough if there is a strong
probability of armed attack-an imminent threat of armed attack." Waldock, supra note 124, at
500.
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could be either acceptable to states or conducive to minimum order. 152
Under the Caroline interpretation, absent an immediate or instant
need to act, a state has no right of self-defense until an "armed attack"
actually occurs. Creeping violations of territorial rights must be suffered
unless the Security Council acts effectively-an unlikely proposition. To
avoid the resultant incongruities, the concept of necessity must be sepa-
rated into two components: 1) necessity calling for instant and immedi-
ate response, and 2) necessity in the absense of any other alternative.
The second component of necessity assumes importance today because
neither a residual legal right to declare aggressive war nor an un-
paralyzed Security Council exists. If an appeal to the proper authorities
would be pointless, a form of necessity arises whereby the threatened
state could justifiably enter the offending state and eliminate the threat to
its sovereignty. Evaluation of a claim of necessity always will require
careful analysis of various factors besides to the element of immediacy.
15 3
The requirement of necessity, therefore, really constitutes an abbre-
viation for the threat of armed attack and the lack of an opportunity to
seek a peaceful settlement. The standard considers prior violation of in-
ternational law implicit in the preparation to launch an armed attack by
a state or its surrogates, as well as a de facto refusal or inability of the
offending state to employ alternatives to conflict resolution other than
force.
Responses in self-defense must not only be necessary, but also pro-
portionate to the complained of transgression. The proportionality con-
cept,154 became widely accepted in the twentieth century and provides
one basis of the modern view of self-defense articulated in the UN Char-
ter.155 Defensive action which greatly exceeds provacation, as measured
by relative casualties or scale of weaponry, will be condemned as illegally
disproportionate. Governments, by and large, observe the proportional-
ity requirement when faced with isolated attacks. 156
Proportionality is closely linked to necessity as a requirement of self-
defense. Acts of self-defense must not exceed, in manner or aim, the
necessity provoking them. "Proportionality in coercion constitutes a re-
quirement that responding coercion be limited in intensity and magni-
152 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 230.
153 Id. at 242.
154 Secretary Webster in the Caroline case also maintained that "the act justified by the neces-
sity of self-defense must be limited by that of necessity and kept clearly within it." IV J. MOORE,
supra note 120, at 412. See also J. BRIERLY, supra note 123, at 405-07; M. McDOUGAL & FELICI-
ANO, supra note 131, at 217-18.
155 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 130, at 261-65.
156 For example, as one scholar theorized, the use of nuclear weapons would be a dispropor-
tionate and thus illegitimate response to a conventional attack in most cases. Singh, The Right of
Self-Defense in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 5 INDIAN Y.B. OF INT'L As'. 3, 324 (1956).
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tude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the permissible
objectives of self-defense." '157 While this general formula leaves room for
different application in particular cases, uncertainty in some situations
does not impair the essential validity of the principle or its practical ap-
plication in many conflicts.
Self-defense is an inherent international legal right of all nations rec-
ognized by the UN Charter. The right of self-defense may arise in order
to counter the use of force, an immediate threat of the use of force, or to
respond to a continuing threat. Although a threat of force is generally
thought of in terms of actions by a state's conventional forces, state-spon-
sored terrorist activity also constitutes a hostile act enabling the right of
self-defense to be exercised to protect a state's essential interests-con-
strued as its citizens, forces, property or national policy objectives.
Although not a limitation on the right of self-defense, international law
generally restricts acts of self-defense to measures necessary, relevant,
and proportionate to the threat.
4. Peacetime Reprisals
Reprisals are methods adopted by states to secure redress from an-
other state by taking retaliatory measures. 158 Under customary interna-
tional law, reprisals consisted of injurious and otherwise internationally
illegal acts of one state against another permitted on an exceptional basis,
namely to compel the latter to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a
dispute created by its initial international delinquency." 9 Reprisals pre-
date the present state system since they originated in the medieval prac-
tice of private reprisals. 60 The sovereign authorized these acts of
retaliation upon the issuance of "letters of marque and reprisal" to re-
dress wrongs committed by the citizens of one state against those of an-
other. 161 The private reprisal aimed primarily to compensate victims of
157 1. OPPENHEIM, supra note 72, at 136. See the discussion of the Naulilaa case infra.
158 See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, 62 U.S. NAV. WAR COLL. INT'L
L. STUDIES 129, 130-31 (1980).
159 W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 902 (3d ed. 1971); W. LEVI,
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 312 (1979). Vattel wrote:
"Reprisals are used between nations and nations to do themselves justice when they cannot other-
wise obtain it." E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 283 (J. Chitty trans. & ed. 1852).
1 160 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss at length the historical development of
reprisals particularly since it is more than adequately treated in Taulbee and Anderson, Reprisal
Redux, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309 (1984); VERZIJL, 8 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 37 (1976). The word "retaliation" is often used synonymously with "reprisal,"
although certain distinctions were drawn relative to the purposes of each. See, eg., Clark, English
Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 695-96 (1933).
161 See W. BISHOP, supra note 158, at 848 (quoting Vattel who wrote that "whoever ill-treats a
citizen indirectly injures the state, which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured
citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish
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injustice. Private reprisals were abolished, initially on an individual
country basis, then by all the states that signed the Treaty of Paris in
1856.162 Since 1856, reprisals by private individuals have been regarded
as illegal, with only states entitled to recourse to this form of self-help.
The concept of interstate or public reprisals originated in the late
eighteenth century and was often cited, until World War II, as justifica-
tion for the use of force during peacetime.1 63 A state undertook these
reprisals "to secure redress for a legal wrong inflicted by another state,"
by "inflicting a not disproportionate injury.., designed to compel con-
sent to a just and satisfactory settlement."' 164 Thus, reprisals sought
more than simply to secure compensation for a wronged citizen. They
became "a sanction, a weapon to enforce a change in the opponent's
policy."1
65
The doctrine of reprisals during peacetime was grossly misused and
frequently characterized as "a weapon in the hands of the Great Pow-
ers." ' 66 Despite this misuse, reprisals were far from useless. If one re-
spects the rules governing the use of reprisals, then reprisals serve as a
reasonable weapon in the modem international legal order's arsenal to
combat terrorism.
Modem formulations of reprisals usually find their genesis in the
Naulilaa Incident Arbitration decision.' 67 The arbitral tribunal specified
the following basic prerequisites for legal reprisals:
The first prerequisite, sine qua non, for the right to exercise reprisals is
an occasion furnished by a previous act contrary to international
law....
him, since otherwise the citizens will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is protection.");
F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971).
162 Reprinted in I. L. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 156 (1972).
163 A distinction must be drawn between "peacetime" reprisals and wartime or belligerent
reprisals, the latter accepted practice with severe restrictions during hostilities, the former, generally
condemned as illegal since the adoption of the United Nations Charter. See notes 179-96 and accom-
panying text infra. Unless otherwise indicated reference to reprisals will be to reprisals in peacetime.
164 Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 60, 68
(1926).
165 E. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1948).
166 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 130, at 220.
167 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration (Port. v. Ger.) 2 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1012 (1928)
reprinted in W. BISHOP, supra note 159, at 903-04. The incident was essentially as follows: In
October 1914, when Portugal was still neutral, a German official and two German officers in South-
West Africa were killed and two others interned by members of the Portuguese frontier garrison at
Naulilaa in Portugues Angola. Subsequent investigation revealed that the original incident had been
caused by the inability of the German officials and officers to understand Portuguese. Nevertheless,
the governor of the German colony ordered reprisals to be undertaken and sent German military
forces into Angola. These forces destroyed several forts and outposts and compelled the Portuguese
to evacuate Naulilaa. Both sides agreed to submit the question of responsibility to arbitration.
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Reprisals are only lawful when preceded by an unsatisfied demand.
The use of force is only justified by its character of necessity.
Even if one admitted that international law does not require that the
reprisal be approximately measured by the offense, one should cer-
tainly consider as excessive, and thus illegal, reprisals out of all propor-
tion with the act which motivated them.168
These elements have been utilized by various scholars to form the
basis for the modem definition of reprisals. For example, Professor
Bowett lists the three preconditions of reprisal as:
(1) The target state must be guilty of a prior international delin-
quency against the claimant state.
(2) An attempt by the claimant state to obtain redress or protection
by other means must be known to have been made, and failed, or to be
inappropriate or impossible in the circumstances.
(3) The claimant's use of force must be limited to the necessities of
the case and proportionate to the wrong done by the target state.'
69
Reference to the element of intent can distinguish reprisals from
self-defense. Self-defense is future oriented since its goal is state secur-
ity against threats to its territory or sovereignty. Reprisals, on the
other hand, are oriented to the past; they seek to punish previous ille-
gal acts and prevent their recurrence.170 However, the distinction be-
tween self-defense and reprisals is far harder to make in practice than
to define. As Professor Bowett has declared:
Not only is the motive or purpose of a state notoriously difficult to
elucidate but, even more important, the dividing line between protec-
tion and retribution becomes more and more obscure as one moves
away from the particular incident and examines the whole context in
which the two or more acts of violence have occurred. Indeed, within
the whole context of a continuing state of antagonism between state,
with recurring acts of violence, an act of reprisal may be regarded as
being at the same time both a form of punishment and the best form of
protection for the future, since it may act as a deterrent against future
acts of violence by the other party. 17 1
Reprisals take many forms172 but generally fall in two categories:
positive reprisals which entail overt acts that would otherwise be illegal,
and negative reprisals consisting of refusing to perform ordinarily obliga-
168 Id. at 1026.
169 Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972). Cf. F.
KALSHOVEN, supra note 161, at 33.
170 Id. See also Schwartzenberger, supra note 142, at 313; Waldock, supra note 124, at 464.
171 See Bowett, supra note 169.
172 Typical types of reprisals are embargo, military occupation, naval bombardment, boycott,
pacific blockade, and intervention. In using reprisals to combat state sponsored terrorism the focus
here will be primarily on armed reprisals although, as in the case of Libya, other reprisals, such as
economic sanctions, may be appropriate.
Vol. 19:243
SELF-HELP
tory acts. 173 Retaliatory acts are designed: (1) to enforce obedience to
international law by discouraging further illegal conduct; (2) to compel a
change in policy by the delinquent state; and (3) to force a settlement of a
dispute with the delinquent state whose actions breached international
law. 74 Once an internationally recognized obligation has been breached,
a particular state must be identified as responsible. 175 This is especially
important in consideration of reprisals against states alleged to have
sponsored terrorist acts.
The use of armed reprisals requires prior identification of a responsi-
ble state or entity followed by attempts to achieve peaceful redress of the
dispute. 176 However, no attempt to obtain peaceful redress is required if
it appears "inappropriate or impossible in the circumstances."'' 77 For ex-
ample, given the futility of Israel's past resorts to the Security Council
and the possible adverse effect on Israeli citizens and property of an un-
successful attempt to secure condemnation of PLO attacks, Israel would
be entitled to act in reprisal, without attempting peaceful redress so long
as the a response is in proportion to the initial attack.
As with self-defense, must a reprisal satisfy the requirement of pro-
portionality to be legitimate? Indeed, as Professor Bowett has noted,
"reasonable" reprisals roughly equivalent to the previous illegal injury,
are less likely to be condemned by the Security Council. 178 A propor-
tional response depends on circumstances and, in general, requires:
- armed force in reprisal will not be used to regain redress for trivial
rights;
- the use of force must be executed as humanely as possible
- the retaliating state must avoid any use of force that would cause
or escalate into a war; and
- the force employed must be confined to obtaining redress only.
Rough equivalence in the number of deaths and extent of property dam-
age remains the sine qua non of proportionality.' 79 However, the status
of certain persons excludes them from this calculation, e.g., murdering
PLO children in retaliation for the murder of Israeli children. The pro-
173 1. OPPENHEIM, supra note 72, at 140.
174 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 130, at 152.
175 1. OPPENHEIM, supra note 72.
176 Traditionally, a demand for redress involves three elements: (1) the offending state in-
formed of the wrong; (2) the lapse of a reasonable amount of time for the offending state to respond;
and (3) refusal of the offending state to make amend. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 72, at 142-43.
177 See Bowett, supra note 169.
178 Professor Bowett describes the Israeli situation and their use of reprisals in some detail in
his article, supra note 169. See also Falk, supra note 138; Levenfeld, Israeli Counter-Fedayeen Tactis
in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisals Under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1 (1982).
179 Bowett, supra note 169, at 7, 11 (Condemnations of Israel have followed when the Council
has stressed the disproportionate nature of the reprisal).
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hibition of reprisals against certain objects and facilities by the laws of
war also must be observed. 18 Additionally, proportionality must be cal-
culated on the basis of prior events. Therefore, an accumulation of small
events, such as minor terrorist attacks, can justify a single, larger retalia-
tory response in certain instances. Requiring a state to respond to each
nuisance attack with a roughly equal nuisance serves no purpose. Past
attacks should justify a large retaliation only if they are part of a continu-
ous, overall plan of attack that relies on numerous small raids. Any
other approach may unduly risk escalation.
Some scholars have argued that proportionality can also be deter-
mined by reference to future action. In their view, the use of force would
be calculated to prevent an enemy from engaging in the threatened attack
against the defending state.181 Obviously, basing proportionality on a
necessarily speculative assessment of the enemy's future conduct runs the
risk of becoming too permissive, unlike anticipatory self-defense where
an armed attack is imminent thus justifying a response to the threat. If
an unfounded expectation of a massive enemy attack or series of attacks
can justify a massive anticipatory thrust to deter the imagined onslaught,
then the rule of law would be irrelevant. Furthermore, proportionality
would have no meaning since preventive application of force such as a
reprisal action provides no ready reference point for the calculation of a
proportional response. Making justifications for reprisal on the basis of a
future wrong is difficult since the wrong supposedly justifying the retalia-
tory response has yet to occur.
5. Peacetime Reprisals Under the UN Charter
Articles 2 and 51, previously discussed in the context of self-defense,
comprise a minimum order structured to ensure freedom from aggression
and the right of self-defense as a deterrent.18 2 Consequently, many au-
thorities have concluded that reprisals and retaliation are illegal under
the UN Charter. This conclusion derives from the Article 2(4) prohibi-
tion of the use of force, the Article 2(3) injunction to settle disputes
peacefully, and the limitation on force used by states in self-defense
180 Most writers concede, albeit reluctantly, that since proportionality cannot be accomplished
with anything near mathematical certainty, any response not obviously disproportionate to its prov-
ocation satisfies the requirement. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 161, at 344-42.
181 See, e.g. 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (all ratified by the United States) reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR (A. Roberts, and R. Guelff eds. 1982).
182 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 682, argue that "the kind and amount
of permissible reprisal violence is that which is reasonably designed so as to affect the enemy's expec-
tations about the costs and gains of reiteration or continuation of his unlawful act as to induce the
termination of and future abstention from such act."
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stated in Articles 51 and 53.183 Professor Brownlie thus concluded "the
provisions of the Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes
and nonresort to the use of force are universally regarded as prohibiting
reprisals which involve the use of force."
184
The Security Council has also condemned "reprisals as incompatible
with the purpose and principles of the United Nations."18 5 The Coun-
cil's rationale was that UN members have contracted not to use force to
resolve international controversies. 18 6 Since reprisals were not consid-
ered as the use of force in self-defense, they were considered illegal.
Despite Security Council condemnation, actual practice has shown
that an inconsistency exists between the statements and actions of both
the Security Council and the General Assembly regarding reprisals. The
Council has generally not condemned a reprisals considered "reason-
able." By condemning only unreasonable or disproportionate reprisals,
the Council has affirmed the right of states to resort to reasonable repri-
sals. As Professor Bowett has observed: "There is clearly some evidence
that certain reprisals will, even if not accepted as justified, at least avoid
condemnation."1 7 Israeli counterterrorist measures, the subject of most
of the condemnations by the Security Council as illegal reprisals.18 8 They
have been justified by the Israelis largely as reprisals or retaliation, and
less frequently as self-defense. 1 9
The legality of reprisals has been addressed in the context of the
Middle East by Professors Falk and Blum in the aftermath of the Decem-
ber 1968 Israeli reprisal against the Beirut airport. 9 ' Professor Falk ar-
gues that the Beirut reprisal constituted a violation of international law
because it involved the use of force without any recourse to diplomatic
183 Id. at 121-24.
184 The United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation Among States, supra note 8, also declares that: "States have a duty to
refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."
185 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 130, at 281. See also L. GOODRICH AND E. HAMBRO, CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 95-96, 102 (1949); HIGGINS, supra note 136, at 202-05, 217-18 (1963);
Contra, E. COLBERT, supra note 165, at 203; J. STONE, supra note 135, at 43, 94-98; Bowett, supra
note 169, at 13-14; W. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR, 370-71 (1981); G.
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 500 2d ed. 1970; 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 150-59 (1971).
186 Falk, supra note 138, at 429 and n. 37. Statement made in censure of U.K. for carrying out
reprisals against the Yement town of Harib in retaliation for Yemeni support of the war in Aden.
187 M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Legal Regulation of the Right to International Coercion, 68
YALE L.J. 1057, 1063-64 (1956).
188 See Bowett, supra note 169, at 18-21.
189 Id.
190 H. ALON, COUNTERING PALESTINIAN TERRORISM IN ISRAEL 16-19 (1980) (Describes Is-
raeli retaliatory raids as "reprisals."); M. DAYAN, MOSHE DAYAN: STORY OF MY LIFE 172-173,
190-191 (1976). Nevertheless, self-defense remains the central theme of all Israeli military actions
because of their (and Arab) perceptions of themselves being in a constant state of war.
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solutions. Also, the Israelis failed to establish a direct link between the
Lebanese Government and the Palestinian terrorists.1 91 However, Falk
did not adopt the strict stance espoused by the United Nations and claim
that all reprisals were forbidden. He established twelve preconditions
which would have to be met before any reprisal could be legally under-
taken. These preconditions can be summarized as follows:
- a diligent effort be made to achieve a concilatory result over a
reasonable period of time, including recourse to international
organizations;
- the use of force is proportional to the provocation;
- the retaliatory action be taken only against military and paramili-
tary targets; and,
- the government undertaking the reprisal provide an immediate ex-
planation of its conduct before relevant international organizations. 
192
These stringent requirements make most Israeli reprisals illegal.
Professor Blum responded that Israeli attacks on Arab states sup-
porting terrorism were legal due to the existing state of war between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. 93 Since the Arab states were, in effect,
waging war against Israel by backing terrorist organizations as surro-
gates, Israel could retaliate against those states under the legal right of
self-defense. Despite Israeli characterization of this act as a reprisal, Pro-
fessor Blum preferred to consider their actions under the more palatable
label of self-defense.
Notwithstanding Security Council and General Assembly declara-
tions and scholarly argument to the contrary, Security Council practice
has sanctioned the use of reprisals when they appeared "reasonable." As
Professor Bowett suggests, while reprisals remain de jure illegal, they
have gained de facto acceptance. 194 Thus reprisals should not be con-
demned on their illegality alone, but rather, on the basis of "reasonable-
ness" determined primarily on a case-by-case basis which takes into
account the proportionality of the reprisal more than any other factor. 95
By condemning only unreasonable or disproportionate reprisals, the Se-
curity Council has affirmed the right of states to resort to reasonable
reprisals as a legitimate self-help measure.
Article 2(4) provides further support for the legitimacy of reason-
191 As the result of an Arab terrorist attack on an EL Al aircraft a raid on the Beirut airport
was conducted by Israeli commandos. Several planes were destroyed and the Israeli chief of staff,
General Yetzhak Bar Lev., was reported to have stated the purpose as being "to make clear to the
other side that the price they must pay for terrorist activities can be very high. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5,
1969, § 4, at 1.
192 Falk, supra note 138, at 440-42.
193 Id. See Bowett's critique, supra note 169, at 27-28.
194 Blum, supra note 69, at 254-55.
195 Bowett, supra note 169, at 11.
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able reprisals since it leaves open the possibility that a reprisal is a use of
force not "inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." In the
Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice condoned a resort
to forcible self-help (the passage of British warships through a disputed
channel), thus hinting that some residual right to reprisal remains in the
modem international legal order dominated by the U.N. Charter.19 6
Finally, prohibition of all reprisals may run the risk of leaving much
state conduct unregulated. As Professor Burke explained:
[T]he current state of [international] affairs is characterized by a col-
lective security system that is not effective or likely to be so, by a pref-
erence for peaceful change which unfortunately is not translated into
techniques by which such change may be achieved, and by a set of
economic and social conditions that lead to constant change and fric-
tion inflicting more or less serious deprivations, though less than the
use of force, upon state interests. As a result of these factors .... a
state may suffer considerable injury that the existing system remains
completely unable to remedy through collective procedures. If the in-
dividual state is also forbidden to resort to minor coercion in self-help,
the accumulation of irritations and pressures may create conditions
favorable to the employment of very intense forms of coercion. 197
It is preferable to maintain legal standards that govern resort to coercion
short of war, rather than abandon any regulation of such force by a blan-
ket condemnation. States will ignore the latter practice. Instead of deter-
mining that reprisals are invariably illegal under the UN Charter, it is far
better to retain the "criteria of reasonableness in a situation that threat-
ens at many points to deteriorate into intense and limitless forms of vio-
lent conduct."19' The case for the legality of reprisals is well stated by
Professor Burke:
[I]nstances of permissible use of minor coercion recognized in interna-
tional law before the U.N. Charter continue to be lawful, and, in par-
ticular ... Article 2(3) and 2(4) do not extend to complete prohibition
of all forms of coercion other than that employed in individual or col-
lective self-defense. The state is entitled ... to rely upon prescriptions
of customary international law such as permissible reprisals.... This
argument may be supplemented by the allegation that the exercise of
forcible measures of self-help is fully within the community's expecta-
tions about the sanctions permissible under international law and that
the United Nations Charter may be interpreted appropriately to reflect
196 Id. at 10-12.
197 Waldock, supra note 124, at 501, argues that the court "apparently allowed a demonstra-
tion of force not merely for insuring safe exercises of the right of passage but to test the attitude of
the wrong-doer and to coerce it into future good behavior. This seems to go close to allowing forci-
ble self-help without reference to the United Nations."
198 Burke, The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework of Inquiry, in
ESSAYS ON INTERVENTION 109 (Stanger ed. 1964).
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these expectations. 199
In sum, the doctrine of peacetime reprisals establishes a desirable
tool for maintaining a semblance of legal regulation over the use of force
short of war. Recognition of proportional reprisals and responses in self-
defense as legitimate tools of self-help will clarify the meaning of both
and eliminate the necessity of trying to fit every use of armed force within
the context of self-defense. This had diluted the meaning of self-defense
to the point it signified little more than a propaganda code word to justify
every use of force, legitimate or otherwise. The better approach is to
judge the use of force on the basis of measurable criteria (the wrong com-
mitted, identifiable transgressor, exhaustion of peaceable remedies, neces-
sity and proportionality), rather than argue incessantly about the legality
of reprisals or the limits of the use of force in self-defense.
6. U.S. Policy and Peacetime Reprisals: The Attacks on Libya
The United States has generally followed the statements of the UN
and "taken the categorical position that reprisals involving the use of
force are illegal under international law .... ,o In 1973, the Depart-
ment of State rejected a proposal by Professor Rostow that the United
States condone reprisals as measure of self-help when a state cannot or
will not fulfill its international legal obligations.2 °1 However, the U.S.
practice has shifted somewhat from a blanket condemnation of reprisals
to an insistence that the terrorist acts which provoked a state into repri-
sals be condemned at the same time.z2 While the United States recog-
nizes the principles of anticipatory self-defense and the difficulty
sometimes encountered in distinguishing between the exercise of self-de-
fense and an act of proportionate reprisal, it insists on maintaining the
distinction without attempting to clarify the difference between the two.
As the State Department noted, U.S. Government officials, including the
President, have often labeled actions as reprisals, retaliation or retribu-
tion, only later to justify them on the basis of self-defense.20 3
On April 5, 1986, a terrorist bomb exploded in a West Berlin night-
club frequented by American service personnel. Two Americans and a
Turkish women were killed, and 239 others were wounded. In response,
U.S. air strikes were carried out on a military airport near Tripoli, a
barracks used as a command and control center, a training area allegedly
199 Falk, supra note 138, at 431, n. 39.
200 Burke, supra note 198.
201 Statement of Ms. J.W. Willis, Deputy Assistant Legal Advisor for European Affairs, Dept.
of State, 1979 DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT'L L. 1749, 1752 (1983). See also M. WHITEMAN,
supra note 185.
202 Id. at 1750.
203 Id. at 1752.
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used by terrorists, other barracks and command posts, and Benina Air
Base from which defensive, suppressive activities and air defense could be
mounted against U.S. forces. The U.S. justified the attack as follows:
These strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right of self-defense
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This necessary and
appropriate action was a preemptive strike, directed against the Libyan
terrorist infrastructure and designed to deter acts of terrorism by
Libya, such as the Libyan-ordered bombing of a discotheque in West
Berlin on April 5.20
Secretary Shultz described the U.S. attack as "an act of self-defense...
proportionate to the sustained, clear, continuing, and widespread use of
terror against Americans and others by Qadhafi's Libya. ' 20 5 Later, in
response to a question, Shultz stated the primary objective was "to de-
fend ourselves both in the immediate sense and prospectively. '20 6
The U.S. response to Libyan terrorism met all the criteria of a rea-
sonable reprisal. All attempts by the United States at pacific redress-
quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions, and demon-
stration of military force-had failed. The United States approached
Arab states requesting them to convince Qadhafi that he should stop sup-
porting terrorism. The United States terminated diplomatic relations
with Libya and unilaterally imposed economic sanctions, despite failing
to convince its allies to join in multilateral sanctions. Next, the United
States demonstrated its ability to use force by posturing off the coast of
Libya. But nothing worked. Libya clearly had been guilty of numerous
acts of terrorism and compelling evidence demonstrated its direct com-
plicity in the Berlin bombing. In view of the failure of these other alter-
natives, the air strikes were considered necessary and proportionate,
given their concentration on purely military targets which ostensibly
could be used in direct support of terrorist acts.20 7 Beyond its retributive
aspects, the attack was likely to further the constructive goal of deterring
terrorism. 0 8
However, U.S. government officials characterized the attack as
purely one of self-defense based on assertions that Libya was engaged in
204 Id. at 1751. See also President Reagan's statement, supra note 21.
205 President Reagan's Letter to Congress, April 16, 1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 8 (June 1986).
206 Joint News Conference by Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger, April 14, 1986 Id. at
3.
207 Id. at 4. See also the White House statement of April 14, 1986 (It's our hope that action
will preempt and discourage Libyan attacks against innocent civilians in the future.) and President
Reagan's address to the Nation, April 14, 1986 (We believe that this preemptive action against
terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi's capacity to export terror, it will pro-
vide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior.) Id. at 1-2.
208 One of the targets was supposedly Qadhafi's personal guards. It was never explained what
role, if any, they had in terrorist acts. Most likely they were targeted more for demonstration
purposes.
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"sustained, clear, continuing and widespread use of terror against Ameri-
can[s] and others.. .,209 The United States also cited previous attacks
and the statements of Qadhafi that he wanted to have America "fight on
a hundred fronts in support of the attack."' 2"' As Professor Bowett
noted, the dividing line between protection (self-defense) and retribution
(reprisal) is elusive.
Indeed, with the whole context of a continuing state of antagonism
between states, with recurring acts of violence, an act of reprisal may
be regarded as being at the same time both a form of punishment and
the best form of protection for the future, since it may act as a deter-
rent against future acts of violence by the other party.21'
If the United States accepted proportionate reprisals as an acceptable,
legitimate form of self-help, it would be unnecessary to stretch the mean-
ing of self-defense, especially by alluding to some future, ill-defined, po-
tential acts of terrorism which may prove exceedingly difficult to link to
state support.
Clearly, reprisals have utility in combatting terrorism. If employed
with restraint and only when other alternatives or justifications for the
use of force do not exist, reprisals can constitute an effective response to
the intimidation and violence of state-sponsored terrorism. Sponsoring
states and their surrogates would be forced to factor this response into
the cost-benefit analysis of conducting or supporting further terrorist
acts. Given present state practice regarding reprisals (where expediency
appears to prevail over the letter of the law and utility of proportionate
reprisals as a last resort), the United States should abandon its present
policy. In a stronger policy, the United States should undertake to clar-
ify what responses are acts in self-defense, measures in reprisal or both.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE WILL TO CHALLENGE HOSTES HUMANI
GENERIS
"[A] civilization that can thus succumb ... must have become so de-
generate that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody
else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this
is so, the sooner such a civilization receives notice to quit, the better."
209 Until the September bombings in Paris, there were not middle eastern instigated terrorist
attacks in Europe and few attacks from local terrorist groups. However, it is arguable whether it
was the U.S. attack on Libya or tightened security measures, increased surveillance of Libyan diplo-
mats and better intelligence sharing that contributed to the relatively few attacks Western Europe
experienced.
210 Statement of President's Press Secretary, Larry Speakes, N.Y. Times, April 15, 1986, at
Al1. See also, Statement of Ambassador Walters before the Security Council on April 15, 1986, 86
DEP'T ST. BULL. 19 (June 1986).
211 Id.
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-iJ.S. Mill 2 12
"Were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no
rules of war, the former must also suspend the observance of them
_Hume 213
The challenge of terrorism is fundamentally a challenge of will. If a
test of strength between those who initiate and support terrorist violence
and those who oppose it is to occur, then that challenge can only be met
by the exercise of power. That power derives from a legal-political struc-
ture designed for regulation, not reformation.
At present, little chance exists of terrorism being controlled on a
universal basis as long as states and international organizations are pre-
pared to apply a double standard of legality. They currently confer legal-
ity and respectability upon acts of violence that are committed by those
with whom they sympathize, especially when their position can be ex-
plained using the language of the new international order that places
"self-determination" and "independence" above any other principle or
obligation. In a recent poll of Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and
other areas of the Middle East, 87.6% of those surveyed felt the 1978
hijacking of an Israeli bus in which 34 people were killed was justified;
81.2% responded the same for the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines in
Beirut; 60.5% favored placing a bomb in an Israeli El Al airliner; and
36.9% supported the Rome and Vienna airport massacres in December,
1985.214 The poll revealed that almost 60% agreed that "armed strug-
gle" was the most effective tactic for solving the Palestinian issue; and
Palestinians generally "favor violence and terror and will brook no ac-
commodation with Israel or its very existence. Equally importantly, the
poll shows that terror is not likely to end; it might actually increase."21
Since a violent, anti-democratic, anti-western and anti-semitic soci-
ety such as that of Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank serves as a birth-
place for terrorists and terrorism in general, it is readily apparent that the
national will be enlightened about the threat and engaged in the fight. It
will be long, hard, complex and bitter. The fight will be one of confusion
and accusation. We will continue to witness an assault on global order
by radical or totalitarian regimes which provide covert support to ter-
rorists. That support can always be denied in the absence of any "proof"
of direct links to terrorists. In addition to the ability to assert a plausible
denial, supporters of terrorism attempt to turn the tables by incessant
212 Bowett, supra note 169, at 3.
213 J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 162-63 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1974).
214 D. HUME, SELECTIONS 208 (C. Hendel, Jr. ed. 1955).
215 Disquieting Palestinian Poll, Wash. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at 20; Palestinian Majority Backs
Terror Tactics, Honolulu Advertiser, Sept. 9, 1986, at D.
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condemnations of states that have used force in response to terrorists and
states supporting terrorism that have not been effective in covering their
tracks. This phenomenon is summarized by Professor Moore:
A constant and recurring confusion in dealing with terrorism is the
failure to condemn terrorism as a policy of aggressive violence in viola-
tion of the United Nations Charter and instead to condemn the defen-
sive response of the democracies to terrorist attack as though the
defensive response were itself the aggressive attack. In part, this re-
sults from terrorist warfare as covert war in which the attack is denied
using all of the means available to modern intelligence and political
disinformation networks. By so doing the attacking nations seek to
conceal the attack as part of the general background noise of ongoing
international terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The full weight of the
international immune system against aggressive attack is then applied
to the relatively open defensive response against the secret attack. This
syndrome of "the invisible attack" and "the anemic defense right"
threatens to destroy the international immune system against aggres-
sive attack, and by destroying the distinction between attack and de-
fense, to destroy the most important principle in 2000 years of human
thought about war prevention.216
Although more laws are needed to close loopholes, law itself will
never be sufficient to stop terrorism. The absence of compulsory adjudi-
cation on a general basis may be cited in support of this assertion. But,
even if compulsory judicial settlement were legally required for the illegal
acts of a state or international brigands, a recalcitrant offender hiding in
a state supportive of its acts could avoid effective compliance. Under
Article 39 of the UN Charter,217 the Security Council may seek to com-
pel compliance by requiring the state sponsoring terrorism to pay repara-
tions for the wrong committed. However, prevailing political differences
and the requirement of unanimous approval by the permanent members
of the Council render such enforcement measures ineffective.
Consequently, a state defending itself against terrorism must look to
other means, including the selective use of force. Use of force can never,
nor should it, be used in isolation. It must supplement diplomatic and
other action. Restraint must be used but should not prevent use of force
when a state deems it justified (necessary) and feasible. If a state is
grievously injured by continuing terrorist attacks, and the organized in-
ternational community is incapable of affording timely redress, then the
injured state must stand ready to take necessary and proportionate meas-
ures to protect itself and its "essential" interests without condemnation
216 Id.
217 Testimony of Professor J.N. Moore before Sen. Denton on Legal Mechanisms to Combat
Terrorism, April 23, 1986 reprinted in 6 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAW AND NATIONAL
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 3 (May 1986).
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from the world community. As long as those measures are necessary and
proportionate, the response is "legal," irrespective of its characterization
as either an act of self-defense or reprisal.
U.S. policy should be modified to embrace the entire spectrum of
legal, diplomatic, economic, political and military measures to counter
terrorist attacks. The elements of such a policy should weave a seamless
web of deterrence (the defensive prevention of attack), pre-emption (an-
ticipatory self-defense) and retaliation/reprisals (punishment and active
discouragement of future terrorist attacks). By failing to include repri-
sals as a credible option, U.S. policy permits the terrorists and their state
supporters to occupy a superior strategic and tactical position. The de-
struction of the Marine barracks in Beirut illustrates this point. The ter-
rorist knew that there would be little or no price for their actions because
of a lack of national will and the existence of substantial political and
legal barriers21 make it extremely unlikely that the United States will
use force.
The discussion .of actions in self-defense and reprisals has high-
lighted distinctions and similarities. Self-defense serves primarily to pro-
tect the security of the state and its essential interests (such as territorial
integrity and political independence) by direct means. Reprisals, on the
other hand, have a punitive purpose, i.e., through indirect means to deter
repetition of the illegal conduct. However, it is frequently difficult to
discern in actual practice the purposes for which a nation might take an
action. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish the two principles by
examining the fundamental difference in the nature of the threat in each
instance. The legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense always in-
volves a situation, where an imminent and serious threat to the vital in-
terest of the defending state generates a necessity to act to protect those
interests. In this respect, the critical criteria for evaluation are the sever-
ity, immediacy and continuing nature of the threat. On the other hand,
reprisals contemplate responsive actions in retribution for prior, com-
pleted illegal acts by the offending state. In these instances, the element
of immediacy or continuance of the threat is not present. However, this
distinction, commonly drawn between the rights of self-defense and re-
prisals, remains, at best, a very tenuous one. In reality, whether consid-
ered in terms of the interests on behalf of which or the acts in response to
which force may be employed, little appreciable difference appears be-
tween forcible reprisals and self-defense. While a difference exists in the
conditions held to govern the exercise of reprisals and self-defense, this
218 Article 39 provides:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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difference appears quite modest when applied to provocative and unlaw-
ful behavior in the context of an antagonistic relationship between states.
Characterization of a military response to terrorist attacks as a re-
prisal, whether accurate or not, should not be sufficient to declare it a
violation of international legal order. Military force should be used only
if the stakes justify it; if other means are not available; and then, only in a
manner appropriate to achieve the desired end-stopping state support
of terrorism. Punitive military response to terrorism should be employed
in the "pro-active" campaign against terrorism in a manner consistent
with established principles of international law. As Secretary of State
Shultz remarked:
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing
terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on
the soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or
from using force against states that support, train, and harbor ter-
rorists or guerrillas. International law requires no such result. A na-
tion attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or
preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens when
no other means is [sic] available. The law requires that such actions be
necessary and proportionate.
The UN Charter is not a suicide pact. The law is a weapon on our
side, and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent.2 1T
Policy makers realize that the choices which confront them in the
war on terrorism will not always be clear and readily discernible. What
is legal may not always be moral and vice versa. Furthermore, that
which is considered both moral and legal may not be politically feasible.
Policy formulation requires evaluation of all three factors. However, in
using armed force, whether characterized as self-defense or reprisal,
there should be no response without a foundation of strong moral justifi-
cations. Clearly, the populace of a democracy will not view immoral
activities which are on a par with those of terrorists as legitimate. For
example, killing women and children will not be accepted as a legitimate
response to a similar terrorist act. Claiming a defense justifiable for pro-
tection of democratic values while employing tactics similar to those
practiced by terrorists undermines public confidence. Therefore, a mili-
tary response must be based on necessity and restrained in its use. If
perceived as a method of last resort, popular support will remain after all
the shouting subsides.
If a state is expected to act flexibly, effectively and decisively against
219 Every use of force by the United States since 1973 has been the subject of intense political
debate and Congressional inquiry into executive actions that may have run afoul of the War Powers
Resolution. See R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1983); J. MOORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984).
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terrorism acceptable mechanisms must be available to counter terrorist
activities. If anything is clear about fighting state supported terrorism, it
is the need for an active strategy whereby governments are better organ-
ized to respond; and nations are intellectually and psychologically pre-
pared to meet the challenge. Arguing that military action to retaliate or
preempt terrorism is contrary to international law, or that the use of
force against terrorism lowers us to the barbaric level of the terrorists,
serves only to confuse and decrease the potential for a national and inter-
national consensus. Self-help measures are not illegal if exercised with
restraint in response to illegal acts of terrorists. "[T]hose who allege
that the Western democracies run the risk of becoming like the terrorists
they oppose by adopting proactive options to suppress and defeat them
are engaging in a cruel form of deception and falsehood, which only en-
courages and emboldens terrorists who want the United States to be par-
alyzed with indecision and moral vacillation. It is a sad commentary on
the times that it is necessary to reassert our obvious superiority, by any
conceivable yardstick, to the terrorists and their sponsors whose only
politics are those of fear and murder and whose law flows out of the
barrel of a gun."220
Without a right to effective self-help, the value of justice, even when
distinctly threatened, is subjected to the value of peace, even if minimally
threatened. In an imperfect world order, failure to recognize the legiti-
macy of self-help measures in the face of the terrorist threat will detract
from, rather than secure, international peace and a just international
legal order.221
220 G. Shultz, Low Intensity Warfare: The Challenge ofAmbiguity, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 15, 17
(March 1986).
221 Livingstone, Proactive Responses to Terrorism, in FIGHTING BACK, supra note 11, at 109.
1987]

